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Two-Year Time Limit On Bringing Suit Against Insurer for Cost of Replacement of Damaged Property Unreasonable If Replacement Cannot Reasonably Be Done Within Two Years

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Smith, the Court of Appeals, in answering a question posed by the Second Circuit, determined a two-year time-limit on bringing suit against an insurance company was unreasonable because suit could not be brought until the damaged property was replaced. Therefore, as was true in this case, if the damage-repair takes longer than two years, the insured cannot sue for payment:

“[A]n agreement which modifies the Statute of Limitations by specifying a shorter, but reasonable, period within which to commence an action is enforceable” … . We conclude that the contractual period at issue here — two years from the date of “direct physical loss or damage” (i.e., from the date of the fire) — is not reasonable if, as the Second Circuit's question requires us to assume, the property cannot reasonably be replaced within two years.It is true, as the District Court pointed out, that there is nothing inherently unreasonable about a two-year period of limitation. In fact, we have enforced contractual limitation periods of one year … . The problem with the limitation period in this case is not its duration, but its accrual date. It is neither fair nor reasonable to require a suit within two years from the date of the loss, while imposing a condition precedent to the suit — in this case, completion of replacement of the property — that cannot be met within that two-year period. A “limitation period” that expires before suit can be brought is not really a limitation period at all, but simply a nullification of the claim. It is true that nothing required defendant to insure plaintiff for replacement cost in excess of actual cash value, but having chosen to do so defendant may not insist on a “limitation period” that renders the coverage valueless when the repairs are time-consuming. Executive Plaza LLC v Peerless Insurance Company, 2, CtApp 2-13-14

 

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