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INCOMPLETE JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE DEFINITION OF ‘BUILDING’ REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL IN THIS BURGLARY PROSECUTION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined defendant was entitled to a new trial because the court did not properly instruct the jury on the definition of a “building” within the meaning of the burglary statute:

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… “[T]he court instructed the jurors that a dwelling is a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night. A bedroom in a home, where there is more than one tenant, may be considered independent of the rest of the house and may be considered a separate dwelling within a building.’ The court, however, failed to include the part of the definition of building that would require the jury to determine whether the house at issue consisted of two or more units’ and whether the bedroom at issue was a unit that was separately secured or occupied’ (Penal Law § 140.00 [2]). Consequently, given the omission of the definition of [“unit”] and/or [“separately secured or occupied,”] the instruction did not adequately convey the meaning of [“building”] to the jury and instead created a great likelihood of confusion such that the degree of precision required for a jury charge was not met’ ” … . People v Downey, 2018 NY Slip Op 00758, Fourth Dept 2-2-18

CRIMINAL LAW (INCOMPLETE JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE DEFINITION OF ‘BUILDING’ REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL IN THIS BURGLARY PROSECUTION (FOURTH DEPT))/JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL LAW, BURGLARY, (INCOMPLETE JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE DEFINITION OF ‘BUILDING’ REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL IN THIS BURGLARY PROSECUTION (FOURTH DEPT))/BURGLARY (JURY INSTRUCTIONS, INCOMPLETE JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE DEFINITION OF ‘BUILDING’ REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL IN THIS BURGLARY PROSECUTION (FOURTH DEPT))/BUILDING (DEFINITION, BURGLARY STATUTE, INCOMPLETE JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE DEFINITION OF ‘BUILDING’ REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL IN THIS BURGLARY PROSECUTION (FOURTH DEPT))

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