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“Law of the Case” Doctrine Did Not Apply—Dismissal of Affirmative Defense Did Not Constitute Full Litigation of the Issue

In a property-line dispute, the Second Department reversed Supreme Court ruling that the location of the fence on plaintiff’s property was the “law of the case.”  The “law of the case” doctrine was imposed by Supreme Court based on the dismissal of the title insurance company’s affirmative defense which claimed the fence was on defendant’s land.  The Second Department wrote:

“The doctrine of the law of the case’ is a rule of practice, an articulation of sound policy that, when an issue is once judicially determined, that should be the end of the matter as far as Judges and courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction are concerned” …  The doctrine “applies only to legal determinations that were necessarily resolved on the merits in [a] prior decision” …, “and to the same questions presented in the same case” … . “Like claim preclusion and issue preclusion, preclusion under the law of the case contemplates that the parties had a full and fair’ opportunity to litigate the initial determination” … .  Contrary to the determination of the Supreme Court, the prior order …which granted [the] motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 to dismiss …, did not necessarily resolve the issue of whether the fence was located on the plaintiffs’ property or the defendants’ property, as the parties did not have an opportunity to fully litigate that issue… . Ramanathan v Aharon, 2013 NY Slip Op 05621, 2nd Dept 8-14-13

 

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