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Under City Administrative Code, Accident Occurred Before Time Had Expired for Property Owner to Address Ice on Abutting Sidewalk/Lessee Did Not Exacerbate the Dangerous Condition/No Liability for Slip and Fall

The Second Department determined that neither the owner nor the lessee of commercial property could be held liable for a slip and fall on ice covering the abutting sidewalk.  Under the Administrative Code of the City of New York the owner had until 11:00 am to address the ice that formed the night before (the accident occurred prior to 11:00 am). And the lessee was not liable because it did not undertake any ice removal efforts which made the condition more hazardous:

“The owner or lessee of property abutting a public sidewalk is under no duty to remove ice and snow that naturally accumulates upon the sidewalk unless a statute or ordinance specifically imposes tort liability for failing to do so” … . Section 7-210 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York (hereinafter section 7-210) places such a duty on commercial property owners, and imposes tort liability for injuries arising from noncompliance (see Administrative Code § 7-210[a], [b]…). “[T]he language of section 7-210 mirrors the duties and obligations of property owners with regard to sidewalks set forth in Administrative Code sections 19-152 and 16-123” … . Pursuant to Administrative Code section 16-123(a), owners of abutting properties have four hours from the time the precipitation ceases, excluding the hours between 9:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m., to clear ice and snow from the sidewalk (see Administrative Code § 16-123[a]…). Here, the owners had until 11:00 a.m. on the day of the accident to comply with the ordinance. Since that period had not yet expired at the time of the injured plaintiff’s fall, the owners demonstrated, prima facie, that they could not be liable for any failure to clear the sidewalk at the time of the accident … .

The tort liability imposed by section 7-210 extends to “the owner of real property abutting [the subject] sidewalk” (Administrative Code § 7-210[b]). In the absence of a statute or ordinance imposing tort liability on the lessee, it can be held liable only if it, or someone on its behalf, undertook snow and ice removal efforts which made the naturally-occurring conditions more hazardous … . Schron v Jean’s Fine Wine & Spirits Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 00648, 2nd Dept 2-5-14

 

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