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Conveyance Was For Convenience (Getting a Loan) and Was Not a Gift—Property Therefore Remained in Decedent’s Estate

The Second Department determined Surrogate’s Court correctly found that the conveyance of a one-third interest in property was for the decedent’s convenience and was not a gift.  Therefore, the one-third interest was in the decedent’s estate:

The petitioner presented evidence establishing that the decedent’s conveyance was for his convenience, and was designed to obtain a refinance mortgage loan on the property at a more favorable interest rate than would have been offered had decedent’s name remained on the title. The petitioner also presented evidence that, after the refinancing was completed, the decedent’s one-third interest in the subject real property was to be reconveyed to him. …

“In a turnover proceeding, the burden of establishing that the property was that of the decedent rests with the petitioner, and once that burden is met, it shifts to the respondent to establish that it was a gift” … . Here, the petitioner met her initial burden of establishing that the one-third interest in the subject real property belonged to the decedent. The petitioner’s proof included, inter alia, deposition testimony given by [decedent’s brother] George in a related proceeding, wherein he acknowledged that the decedent’s one-third interest was to be reconveyed to the decedent after the refinancing. [Decedent’s sister] Elaine failed to come forward with clear and convincing proof that the decedent intended to make a gift of his interest in the subject real property… .  Matter of Voyiatgis, 2013 NY Slip Op 06700, 2nd Dept 10-16-13

 

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