You are here: / / A CONTRACTUAL NEW YORK CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION OVERRIDES AN OTHERWISE APPLICABLE...
,

A CONTRACTUAL NEW YORK CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION OVERRIDES AN OTHERWISE APPLICABLE NEW YORK STATUTORY CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE APPLICATION OF ANOTHER STATE’S LAW.

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over an extensive dissenting opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam (in which Judge Rivera concurred), the Court of Appeals determined the New York choice of law provision in decedent's retirement and death benefit plans required the application of New York law, even though, under the facts, an otherwise applicable New York statutory choice of law provision required the application of Colorado law.  Decedent was enrolled in both retirement and death benefit plans. He made his wife the beneficiary of the plans and his wife's father the contingent beneficiary. Decedent and his wife divorced and decedent died in Colorado. If the otherwise applicable New York statutory choice of law provision applied, the effect of the divorce would be determined by Colorado law (where decedent died). Under Colorado law, the divorce removed both decedent's wife and her father as beneficiaries of the plans. Under New York law only the wife was removed and her father remained.  The choice of law provision in the retirement and death benefit plans was deemed to supersede the otherwise applicable New York statutory choice of law provision (which would have required analysis under Colorado law):

… [W]e should apply the most reasonable interpretation of the contract language that effectuates the parties' intended and expressed choice of law … . To do otherwise — by applying New York's statutory conflict-of-laws principles, even if doing so results in the application of the substantive law of another state — would contravene the primary purpose of including a choice-of-law provision in a contract — namely, to avoid a conflict-of-laws analysis and its associated time and expense. Such an interpretation would also interfere with, and ignore, the parties' intent, contrary to the basic tenets of contract interpretation. Ministers & Missionaries Benefit Bd. v Snow, 2015 NY Slip Op 09186, CtApp 12-15-15

CIVIL PROCEDURE (CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION OVERRIDES STATUTORY CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION)/CONTRACT LAW (CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION OVERRIDES STATUTORY CHOICE OF LAW PROVISON)/CHOICE OF LAW (CONTRACTUAL PROVISION OVERRIDES STATUTORY PROVISION)/CONFLICT OF LAWS (CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION OVERRIDES STATUTORY CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION)

You might also like
NEW YORK’S BORROWING STATUTE APPLIED TO THE CONTRACT WITH A CANADIAN COMPANY WHICH CALLED FOR THE CONTRACT TO BE ‘ENFORCED’ ACCORDING TO NEW YORK LAW, ONTARIO’S TWO-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RENDERED THE ACTION UNTIMELY (CT APP).
EVEN WHERE A SENTENCE HAS BEEN AGREED TO BY THE DEFENDANT AS PART OF A PLEA BARGAIN, AN INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT IS OBLIGATED TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE SENTENCE IS UNDULY HARSH OR SEVERE, SEPARATE AND APART FROM WHETHER THE SENTENCE IS LEGAL (CT APP).
Failure to Read Jury Notes to Counsel Before Calling in the Jury Was Not a Mode of Proceedings Error—The Error, Therefore, Must Be Preserved by Objection
THE LANDLORD DEMONSTRATED THE ASSAILANT IN THIS THIRD-PARTY ASSAULT CASE WAS NOT AN INTRUDER AND PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ABLE TO RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ON THAT ISSUE, THE LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED, ONE JUDGE DISSENTED (CT APP).
LANDLORD OWED NO STATUTORY DUTY TO ABATE LEAD IN AN APARTMENT WHERE THE CHILD SPENT 50 HOURS PER WEEK IN THE CARE OF HER GRANDMOTHER, LAW REQUIRING LEAD PAINT ABATEMENT APPLIES ONLY TO APARTMENTS WHERE A CHILD RESIDES.
Signing Checks Pursuant to a Power of Attorney Cannot Amount to Forgery 
​ IN A DISPUTE INVOLVING THE TELECAST RIGHTS FOR TWO MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL TEAMS, THE ARBITRATOR EXCEEDED ITS POWERS, WHICH WERE SPELLED OUT IN THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, BY IMPOSING A MONEY JUDGMENT; THE ARBITRATOR’S RULING WAS AFFIRMED BUT THE MONEY JUDGMENT WAS VACATED (CT APP).
THE STATUTE PROHIBITING SEX OFFENDERS FROM BEING WITHIN 1000 FEET OF SCHOOL GROUNDS AS APPLIED TO SEX OFFENDERS CONVICTED BEFORE THE STATUTE WENT INTO EFFECT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE; HERE PETITIONER WAS INCARCERATED PAST HIS PAROLE DATE BECAUSE HOUSING WHICH COMPLIED WITH THE SCHOOL GROUNDS LAW COULD NOT BE FOUND (CT APP). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, DRIVER’S LICENSES. COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES... DISPUTES INVOLVING COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE WERE SUFFICIENTLY RELATED TO INTERSTATE...