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MOTHER’S MOTION FOR FINDINGS ALLOWING HER CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

Reversing Family Court, the Second Department determined mother’s motion for findings allowing her child to petition for special immigrant juvenile status (SIJS) should have been granted:

… [W]e declare that the child has been legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an individual appointed by a state or juvenile court, and we find that the child is unmarried and under 21 years of age, that reunification with one of his parents is not viable due to parental abandonment, and that it would not be in his best interests to return to El Salvador … . Matter of Tommy E. H. (Anonymous) v Silvia C. (Anonymous), 2015 NY Slip Op 09104, 2nd Dept 12-9-15

MONTHLY COMPILATION INDEX ENTRIES FOR THIS CASE:

SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (MOTHER’S MOTION FOR FINDINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/IMMIGRATION LAW (MOTHER’S MOTION FOR FINDINGS ALLOWING HER CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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“BEST EVIDENCE RULE” CRITERIA EXPLAINED; NOT MET HERE. REQUEST FOR STATEMENTS MADE BY WITNESSES WHO DID NOT TESTIFY AT TRIAL (BECAUSE...