You are here: / / Police Did Not Have Sufficient Information to Justify Pursuit of Defendant;...

Police Did Not Have Sufficient Information to Justify Pursuit of Defendant; Street Stop (DeBour) Criteria Clearly Explained

The Second Department determined defendant’s motion to suppress the weapon he discarded during a police pursuit should have been granted. The police approached defendant after seeing him make several adjustments to his waistband. When defendant ran, the police pursued him. Because the police, based on their observations, could make only a level one inquiry (which the defendant had a right to ignore), the pursuit was not justified. The court offered a clear explanation of the criteria for street stops (DeBour criteria):

“On a motion to suppress physical evidence, the People bear the burden of going forward to establish the legality of police conduct in the first instance” … , the Court of Appeals established a graduated four-level test for evaluating the propriety of police encounters when a police officer is acting in a law enforcement capacity … . The first level permits a police officer to request information from an individual, and merely requires that the request be supported by an objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality … . The second level, known as the common-law right of inquiry, requires a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, and permits a somewhat greater intrusion … . The third level permits a police officer to forcibly stop and detain an individual. Such a detention, however, is not permitted unless there is a reasonable suspicion that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime … . The fourth level authorizes an arrest based on probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime … .

In order to justify police pursuit, the officers must have “reasonable suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed” … . Reasonable suspicion has been defined as “that quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious person under the circumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand” … . A suspect’s “[f]light alone . . . even [his or her flight] in conjunction with equivocal circumstances that might justify a police request for information, is insufficient to justify pursuit” … . However, flight, “combined with other specific circumstances indicating that the suspect may be engaged in criminal activity, could provide the predicate necessary to justify pursuit” … . People v Clermont, 2015 NY Slip Op 07989, 2nd Dept 11-4-15

 

You might also like
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GAVE THE GALBO JURY INSTRUCTION RE DEFENDANT’S POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY IN THIS BURGLARY CASE (SECOND DEPT).
THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT HAD BEEN AT LIBERTY FOR 11 YEARS WITHOUT COMMITTING A SEX OFFENSE AND THE FOUR-YEAR DIFFERENCE IN AGE BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND THE VICTIM WARRANTED A DOWNWARD DEPARTURE TO LEVEL ONE (SECOND DEPT). ​
FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO SUA SPONTE VACATE A CONSENT ORDER IN THIS SUPPORT PROCEEDING, VACATION OF THE CONSENT ORDER AND THE RESULTING COMMITMENT ORDER REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).
Specific Disclaimers Indicating No Information Extrinsic to the Written Contract Was Relied Upon Precluded Fraud in the Inducement Cause of Action/Summary Judgment on Promissory Note Precluded—Breach of Contract Cause of Action Was Intertwined with Promissory Note
Criteria for Expanded Jury Instruction on the Voluntariness of a Statement Explained (Criteria Not Met Here)—Trial Judge Should Not Have Participated in Readback of Testimony (Not Reversible Error Here)
Defendant Homeowner Demonstrated She Did Not Have Actual or Constructive Notice of the Dangerous Condition and Did Not Create the Dangerous Condition (Deck Collapsed When Plaintiff Was Inspecting the Property Prior to Beginning Work)
THREE AND A HALF MONTH DELAY IN NOTIFYING THE INSURER OF THE LAWSUIT VIOLATED THE POLICY PROVISION REQUIRING NOTICE AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE; THE DISCLAIMER MAILED 29 DAYS AFTER NOTICE OF THE SUIT WAS RECEIVED BY THE INSURER WAS TIMELY AND PRECLUDED SUIT AGAINST THE INSURER (SECOND DEPT).
Untimely Summary Judgment Motion Which Is Nearly Identical to a Summary Judgment Motion Already Before the Court Should Be Considered

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Work for Which Claimant Was Not Paid Did Not Disqualify Her from Unemployment... Due Diligence Requirements for Nail and Mail Service Do Not Apply Under the...