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“Home or Business Exception” to Criminal Possession of a Weapon Does Not Apply to Defendant Previously Convicted of a Crime

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Smith, the Court of Appeals determined the “home or business exception” to criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree did not apply when the defendant has been previously been convicted of any crime:

…[T]his appeal requires us to interpret the “home or business” exception to the third-degree weapon possession statute, Penal Law § 265.03 (3).  Under that statute:

“A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree when:” (3) such person possesses any loaded firearm.  Such possession shall not, except as provided in subdivision one . . . of section 265.02 of this article, constitute a violation of this subdivision if such possession takes place in such person’s home or place of business.”

Section 265.02 (1), to which the above quoted language refers, defines criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.  Under Penal Law § 265.02 (1), a person is guilty of third degree criminal possession when he or she “commits the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree . . . and has been previously convicted of any crime.”  The Appellate Division read the reference in section 265.03 (3) to section 265.02 (1) as creating an exception to the home or business exception — i.e., to make that exception inapplicable when the defendant has a previous criminal conviction.  We agree with this reading of the statute.  People v Jones, 185, CtApp 11-19-13

 

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