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You are here: Home1 / Workers' Compensation2 / PLAINTIFF WAS A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE, HIS ONLY AVAILABLE REMEDY FOR HIS ON...
Workers' Compensation

PLAINTIFF WAS A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE, HIS ONLY AVAILABLE REMEDY FOR HIS ON THE JOB INJURY WAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant Mid-Queens demonstrated that plaintiff maintenance worker, although employed by KGA, was a special employee of Mid-Queens. Therefore plaintiff’s only remedy for his injury was Workers’ Compensation:

“Workers’ Compensation Law §§ 11 and 29(6) restrict an employee from suing his or her employer or coemployee for an accidental injury sustained in the course of employment” … . “[A] general employee of one employer may also be in the special employ of another, notwithstanding the general employer’s responsibility for payment of wages and for maintaining workers’ compensation and other employee benefits” … . “Although no one factor is determinative, a significant and weighty feature in deciding whether a special employment relationship exists is who controls and directs the manner, details and ultimate result of the employee’s work—in other words, who determines all essential, locational and commonly recognizable components of the [employee’s] work relationship” … . “Other factors include who is responsible for the payment of wages and the furnishing of equipment, who has the right to discharge the employee, and whether the work being performed was in furtherance of the special employer’s or the general employer’s business” … .

Here, the moving defendants made a prima facie showing that Mid-Queens was entitled to summary judgment on the ground that it was the injured plaintiff’s special employer. The evidence submitted by the moving defendants established that Mid-Queens controlled and directed the manner, details, and ultimate result of the injured plaintiff’s work, the injured plaintiff’s work was done in furtherance of Mid-Queens’ business, and Mid-Queens had the right to discharge the injured plaintiff … . Spasic v Cammeby’s Mgt. Co., 2018 NY Slip Op 05616, Second Dept 8-1-18

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (PLAINTIFF WAS A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE, HIS ONLY AVAILABLE REMEDY FOR HIS ON THE JOB INJURY WAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (SECOND DEPT))/SPECIAL EMPLOYEE (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, PLAINTIFF WAS A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE, HIS ONLY AVAILABLE REMEDY FOR HIS ON THE JOB INJURY WAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (SECOND DEPT))

August 1, 2018
Tags: Second Department
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