You are here: / / People’s Delay In Providing Bill of Particulars Did Not Require Dismissal U...

People’s Delay In Providing Bill of Particulars Did Not Require Dismissal Under Speedy Trial Statute

The Fourth Department determined that the People’s delay in providing a bill of particulars did not require dismissal of the indictment pursuant to the speedy trial statute:

…[D]efendant asserted that the People’s bill of particulars was due on January 7, 2009—15 days after defendant’s request (see CPL 200.95 [2])—but that it was not served until August 10, 2009.  According to defendant, the time period from January 7 to August 10, which exceeds six months, constitutes postreadiness delay that should be charged to the People, thus warranting dismissal under CPL 30.30.  We reject that contention. Prior to their failure to serve a timely bill of particulars, the People announced their readiness for trial on the record, and “[f]ailing to serve a bill of particulars is in no way inconsistent with the prosecution’s continued readiness” … .  We addressed a similar contention in People v Runion (107 AD2d 1080), determining that “[t]he court should not have granted the motion made under CPL 30.30 to dismiss the indictment because of the delays of the prosecutor, after she had announced her readiness for trial, in providing discovery materials and in serving a supplemental bill of particulars.  Defendant’s remedies for such delays do not include dismissal under CPL 30.30” (id. at 1080).  People v Griffin, 1154, 4th Dept 11-8-13

 

You might also like
THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, WITHOUT NOTICE TO THE DEFENDANT, ASSESSED 12 POINTS FOR FAILURE TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY; DEFENDANT ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY BY PLEADING GUILTY (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFENDANT HOSPITAL’S EMERGENCY ROOM PERSONNEL WERE UNAWARE PLAINTIFF HAD EXECUTED A “MOLST” DECLINING LIFE-SAVING TREATMENT WHEN THEY PERFORMED CHEST COMPRESSIONS WHICH REVIVED PLAINTIFF BUT FRACTURED RIBS; PLAINTIFF SUFFERED ANOTHER HEART ATTACK SEVEN HOURS LATER AND DIED; A JURY AWARDED DAMAGES FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING; PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY ARTICULATE A STANDARD OF CARE OR A VIOLATION OF A STANDARD OF CARE; THE DEFENSE MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE DEEMED TOO HARSH BASED UPON DEFENDANT’S CRIMINAL HISTORY, THE PLEA DEAL DEFENDANT WAS OFFERED BEFORE TRIAL, AND THE ABSENCE OF ANY NEW EVIDENCE REVEALED BY THE TRIAL (FOURTH DEPT).
CONTRARY TO SUPREME COURT’S RULING, THE PURCHASE CONTRACT DID NOT INCLUDE A CLAUSE LIMITING PLAINTIFF’S REMEDY FOR A BREACH TO RETAINING THE DEPOSIT (FOURTH DEPT).
Violation of Zoning Ordinance Precludes Property Tax Exemption
Finding by Workers’ Compensation Law Judge Precluded Suit Under Labor Law and Common Law Negligence
Party Represented by Counsel at a Scheduled Court Appearance Has Not Failed to Appear
Temporary Lawful Possession of Weapon Defense Disproved/Justification Defense in Context of Criminal Possession of a Weapon Explained

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Prosecutorial Misconduct Noted (Conviction Upheld However) Temporary Lawful Possession of Weapon Defense Disproved/Justification Defense...