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Question of Fact Whether Plaintiff’s Negligence Was Sole Proximate Cause of Injuries in Labor Law 240(1) Action

The Second Department determined there were questions of fact precluding both plaintiffs’ and defendant’s motions for summary judgment in a Labor Law 240(1) action.  Although the ladder which tipped over was not defective and was appropriate to the task, there were questions whether the ladder was mispositioned and, if so, who mispositioned it.  The fact that plaintiff may have been negligent did not preclude recovery under Labor Law 240(1) as long a plaintiff’s negligence was not the sole proximate cause of his injury:

In order to prevail on a Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action, a plaintiff must prove that the statute was violated and that the violation was a proximate cause of the injuries … . Proof that the plaintiff’s own negligence was also a proximate cause will not defeat the claim … . When the evidence establishes, however, that the plaintiff’s own negligence was the sole proximate cause of the injuries, the defendant may not be held liable for those injuries … . The parties’ submissions demonstrated that the ladder itself was not defective and was appropriate to [plaintiff’s] task.

There are triable issues of fact … as to whether the ladder was mispositioned and, if so, who mispositioned it, and, if it was mispositioned by [plaintiff], whether his conduct was the sole proximate cause of the ladder’s tipping over … . Daley v 250 Park Ave., LLC. 2015 NY Slip Op 01917, 2nd Dept 3-11-15

 

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