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Family Court Has No Power to Add to Terms of Remittitur

The Second Department determined Family Court had failed to comply with the terms of its remittitur.  On appeal, the Second Department previously determined that the mother’s commitment to jail for failure to comply with a court order should be reduced from six months to 30 days.  Family Court then committed the mother to 30 days but added she was not to receive allowances for good behavior.  Because the “no allowances for good behavior” was not part of the appellate remittitur, that portion of Family Court’s order was invalid:

Upon a remittitur, a court is ” without power to do anything except to obey the … mandate of the higher court'” … . Here, the Family Court erred in failing to adhere to the terms of this Court’s remittitur by including in the amended order of commitment a provision directing that the mother would not receive time allowances for good behavior. We note that, although the mother is eligible for such time allowances (see Correction Law § 804-a[1]… ), the determination as to whether they should be granted is to be made by the person in charge of the institution where she is committed (see Correction Law § 804-a[3]… . Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Family Court, Nassau County, for the issuance of a second amended order providing that the mother is to be committed to the Nassau County Correctional Facility for a term of 30 days “unless sooner discharged according to law.”  Matter of Cunha v Urias, 2013 NY Slip Op 08624, 2nd Dept 12-26-13

 

 

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