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Basic Criteria Re: Common-Law and Contractual Indemnification Explained

In finding that the criteria for common-law and contractual indemnification were not met, the Second Department explained some of the basic requirements for both:

“[T]he key element of a common-law cause of action for indemnification is not a duty running from the indemnitor to the injured party, but rather is a separate duty owed the indemnitee by the indemnitor'” … . ” Since the predicate of common-law indemnity is vicarious liability without actual fault on the part of the proposed indemnitee, it follows that a party who has itself actually participated to some degree in the wrongdoing cannot receive the benefit of the doctrine'” … .

… General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 …  “generally renders void a clause in a construction contract purporting to indemnify a party for its own negligence” (… see General Obligations Law § 5-322.1). … [A] contractual clause that purports to indemnify a party for its own negligence ” may be enforced where the party to be indemnified is found to be free of any negligence'” … . Dreyfuss v MPCC Corp, 2015 NY Slip Op 00723, 2nd Dept 1-28-15

 

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