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AMONG SEVERAL LABOR LAW, NEGLIGENCE AND INSURANCE ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 ACTION, THE 2ND DEPT DETERMINED SUPREME COURT APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD IN ITS LABOR LAW 200 ANALYSIS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department affirmed and reversed several rulings on defendants’ motions for summary judgment in this Labor Law 240 (1), 241 (6), 200, and common law negligence action. Plaintiff was injured when he slipped on a loose piece of sprinkler pipe on property owned by defendant One City. The 2nd Department determined the correct standard for analyzing the Labor 200 cause of action was under the dangerous condition prong, rather than the manner of work prong, of Labor Law 200 and dismissed that cause of action. There was no proof One City created or knew about the dangerous condition. The Labor Law 241 (6) cause of action properly survived summary judgment because there was a question of fact whether the fall occurred in a passageway that should be kept clear and there was a question fact whether plaintiff was cleaning up the area at the time (which would preclude suit). The 2nd Department further found that there was a question of fact whether another defendant had purchased insurance as required by a contract with One City. The court also addressed indemnification issues. With regard to the Labor Law 200 and common law negligence causes of action, the court wrote:

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Section 200 of the Labor Law is a codification of the common-law duty imposed upon an owner or general contractor to provide construction site workers with a safe place to work … . “Claims for personal injury under the statute and the common law fall into two broad categories: those arising from an alleged defect or dangerous condition existing on the premises and those arising from the manner in which the work was performed” … .”Where the injury was caused by the manner and means of the work, including the equipment used, the owner or general contractor is liable if it actually exercised supervisory control over the injury-producing work” … . “Where an existing defect or dangerous condition caused the injury, liability attaches if the owner or general contractor created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of it” … .

Here, the court finds that the appropriate standard to apply in this case is the dangerous condition standard and not the manner and means standard. The cause of the accident, the piece of loose pipe, was not a condition created by the manner in which the work was performed by plaintiff or his employer but was rather a condition that already existed prior to plaintiff’s arrival on the fifth floor that day.  Prevost v One City Block LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 08303, First Dept 11-28-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (AMONG SEVERAL LABOR LAW, NEGLIGENCE AND INSURANCE ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 ACTION, THE 2ND DEPARTMENT DETERMINED SUPREME COURT APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD IN ITS LABOR LAW 200 ANALYSIS (FIRST DEPT))

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