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ALTHOUGH PETITIONER-ATTORNEY FORMED THE CORPORATIONS WHICH OWNED THE BUILDINGS ON WHICH HE POSTED SIGNS ADVERTISING HIS LAW PRACTICE, THE ADVERTISING VIOLATED THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Tom, over a two-justice dissenting opinion, determined that petitioner (Ciafone), an attorney, who used several buildings owned by his corporate entities for exterior signs promoting his law practice, engaged in unauthorized outdoor advertising and was properly penalized. Ciafone argued that the corporate entitles formed by him which owned the buildings were not “others” within the meaning of the NYC Administrative Code provision which defined an outdoor advertising company as an entity which makes advertising space available to “others:”

Administrative Code § 28-502.1 states that an OAC [outdoor advertising company] is “[a] person, corporation, partnership or other business entity that as a part of the regular conduct of its business engages in or, by way of advertising, promotions or other methods, holds itself out as engaging in the outdoor advertising business.” An Outdoor Advertising Business is “[t]he business of selling, leasing, marketing, managing, or otherwise either directly or indirectly making space on signs situated on buildings and premises within the city of New York available to others for advertising purposes, whether such advertising directs attention to a business, profession, commodity, service or entertainment conducted, sold, or offered on the same or a different zoning lot . . . .” … .

… [P]etitioners, which are corporations, made space on signs available to Ciafone’s law practice (a professional corporation), a separate and distinct entity. Of course, it is fundamental that individuals, corporations, and partnerships are each recognized as separate legal entities, and in this statutory context constitute “others” regardless of the common principal ownership or connection between the entities. Indeed, “[a]s a general rule, the law treats corporations as having an existence separate and distinct from that of their shareholders”… . …

ECB [New York City Environmental Control Board] rationally rejected petitioners’ argument that they had not made the signs available to “others.” The record shows that the building owners are not Ciafone or Ciafone P.C, but separate corporate entities, and that the advertising signs promoted legal services by Ciafone, not any services of the corporate entities that own the buildings. Contrary to petitioners’ argument, there is no basis for overturning ECB’s determination that, in these circumstances, the advertising space was made available “to others.” Nor is ECB’s interpretation of the statutory language arbitrary or irrational. Matter of Franklin St. Realty Corp. v NYC Envtl. Control Bd., 2018 NY Slip Op 05407, First Dept 7-19-18

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (MUNICIPAL LAW, ALTHOUGH PETITIONER-ATTORNEY FORMED THE CORPORATIONS WHICH OWNED THE BUILDINGS ON WHICH HE POSTED SIGNS ADVERTISING HIS LAW PRACTICE, THE ADVERTISING VIOLATED THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE (FIRST DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (NYC, ALTHOUGH PETITIONER-ATTORNEY FORMED THE CORPORATIONS WHICH OWNED THE BUILDINGS ON WHICH HE POSTED SIGNS ADVERTISING HIS LAW PRACTICE, THE ADVERTISING VIOLATED THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE (FIRST DEPT))/CORPORATION LAW  (MUNICIPAL LAW, ALTHOUGH PETITIONER-ATTORNEY FORMED THE CORPORATIONS WHICH OWNED THE BUILDINGS ON WHICH HE POSTED SIGNS ADVERTISING HIS LAW PRACTICE, THE ADVERTISING VIOLATED THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE (FIRST DEPT))/ADVERTISING (SIGNS, MUNICIPAL LAW, ALTHOUGH PETITIONER-ATTORNEY FORMED THE CORPORATIONS WHICH OWNED THE BUILDINGS ON WHICH HE POSTED SIGNS ADVERTISING HIS LAW PRACTICE, THE ADVERTISING VIOLATED THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE (FIRST DEPT))

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