You are here: / / PLAINTIFF WALKED INTO THE REAR OF A TRACTOR TRAILER WHICH WAS MAKING A...

PLAINTIFF WALKED INTO THE REAR OF A TRACTOR TRAILER WHICH WAS MAKING A RIGHT TURN, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ (truck owner’s and driver’s) motion for summary judgment in this pedestrian traffic accident case should have been granted. Plaintiff was injured by the rear portion of a tractor trailer which had completed 85% of a right turn:

… [T]he plaintiff allegedly was walking on a sidewalk … . After she stepped off the sidewalk onto the street, her right foot came into contact with the rear of a tractor-trailer that was making a right turn. … The plaintiff allegedly did not see the tractor-trailer prior to the impact. …

… [T]he plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident … . The evidence … established that the plaintiff failed to see what was there to be seen and walked into the path of the rear of the tractor-trailer. Faulknor v Gina’s Trucking, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 01045, Second Dept 2-14-18

NEGLIGENCE (PEDESTRIANS, TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, PLAINTIFF WALKED INTO THE REAR OF A TRACTOR TRAILER WHICH WAS MAKING A RIGHT TURN, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (PEDESTRIANS, PLAINTIFF WALKED INTO THE REAR OF A TRACTOR TRAILER WHICH WAS MAKING A RIGHT TURN, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/PEDESTRIANS (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, PLAINTIFF WALKED INTO THE REAR OF A TRACTOR TRAILER WHICH WAS MAKING A RIGHT TURN, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO SEAL A CRIMINAL CONVICTION IS CIVIL IN NATURE AND CAN BE APPEALED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT; HERE THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).
THE CRACK OVER WHICH INFANT PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY TRIPPED WAS DEEMED TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW (SECOND DEPT).
MOTHER’S CAUSES OF ACTION FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE IF HER BABY WAS BORN ALIVE; THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE BABY WAS BORN ALIVE OR STILLBORN; THEREFORE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT INSURER DID NOT ELIMINATE ALL QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER PLAINTIFFS (INSUREDS) VIOLATED THE COOPERATION CLAUSE IN THE POLICY (SECOND DEPT).
Plaintiff’s Own Negligence Broke Any Causal Chain Between Defendant’s Negligence and Plaintiff’s Injury
Motion to Set Aside Verdict Properly Denied—The Jury Determined Defendant’s Negligence Was Not the Proximate Cause of the Accident—Analytical Criteria Explained
THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 13O4 AND A CONDITION PRECEDENT IN THE MORTGAGE IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION; THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
THE CITY DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE SIDEWALK/CURB DEFECT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE BECAUSE THE DEFECT DID NOT APPEAR ON THE BIG APPLE MAP WHICH HAD BEEN SERVED ON THE CITY, DESPITE THE APPARENT EXISTENCE OF ANOTHER BIG APPLE MAP WHICH SHOWED THE DEFECT BUT WAS NOT SHOWN TO HAVE BEEN SERVED ON THE CITY (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

TOWN PROPERLY DISSOLVED THE EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT AND CREATED TWO... COURT ATTORNEY REFEREE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO DETERMINE A CONTESTED FAMILY OFFENSE...