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COURT DOES NOT HAVE THE POWER TO IMPUTE INCOME TO A PARTY IN FAMILY COURT ACT CUSTODY-VISITATION PROCEEDINGS FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE PARTY’S ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSIGNED COUNSEL, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Peradotto, reversing Supreme Court, determined the court did not have the power to impute income to the defendant for the purpose of determining defendant’s eligibility for assigned counsel in a Family Court Act custody/visitation matter. Defendant was a PhD student living with his parents and had very little income. After a hearing, Supreme Court imputed $50,000 in annual income to the defendant, making him ineligible for assigned counsel:

… [A] person facing potential jail time for willfully violating court orders has a significant stake in the proceedings, and the legislature has guaranteed an equal playing field between the parties by providing such a person with assigned counsel if he or she is financially unable to obtain private counsel… . Moreover, to the extent that the court is concerned that defendant could bring serial modification petitions with impunity, thereby causing plaintiff to repeatedly expend her personal funds, we note that sanctions may be imposed for frivolous conduct …  and, in an appropriate case, a court may preclude a party from filing new petitions without permission of the court where the record establishes that the party has abused the judicial process by engaging in meritless, frivolous or vexatious litigation … . We thus conclude that the court erred in determining that it was authorized to impute income to defendant in determining his eligibility for assigned counsel and, based upon the documentation provided by defendant indisputably establishing that he “is financially unable to obtain” counsel … . Carney v Carney, 2018 NY Slip Op 02034, Fourth Dept 3-23-18

FAMILY LAW (ATTORNEYS, COURT DOES NOT HAVE THE POWER TO IMPUTE INCOME TO A PARTY IN FAMILY COURT ACT CUSTODY-VISITATION PROCEEDINGS FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE PARTY’S ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSIGNED COUNSEL, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (FAMILY LAW, ASSIGNED COUNSEL,  COURT DOES NOT HAVE THE POWER TO IMPUTE INCOME TO A PARTY IN FAMILY COURT ACT CUSTODY-VISITATION PROCEEDINGS FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE PARTY’S ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSIGNED COUNSEL, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT))/ASSIGNED COUNSEL (FAMILY LAW, COURT DOES NOT HAVE THE POWER TO IMPUTE INCOME TO A PARTY IN FAMILY COURT ACT CUSTODY-VISITATION PROCEEDINGS FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE PARTY’S ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSIGNED COUNSEL, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT))

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