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THE MERE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF FELL FROM AN A-FRAME LADDER IS NOT ENOUGH TO WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF ON A LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION PROPERLY DENIED BUT DEFENDANT’S MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action in this ladder-fall case should not have been granted. Plaintiff testified the A-frame ladder, which he had used before, shook and leaned before he fell. He also testified he did not notice any defects in the ladder. The Second Department held that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied (but defendant’s motion should not have been granted):

“Under Labor Law § 240(1), owners and general contractors, and their agents, have a nondelegable duty to provide safety devices necessary to protect workers from risks inherent in elevated work sites” … . “To prevail on a Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action, a plaintiff must establish that the statute was violated and that the violation was a proximate cause of his or her injuries” … . The mere fact that a plaintiff fell from a ladder does not, in and of itself, establish that proper protection was not provided, and whether a particular safety device provided proper protection is generally a question of fact for a jury … . Here, the plaintiff’s own submissions demonstrated that there are triable issues of fact as to how this accident occurred and it cannot be concluded, as a matter of law, that the alleged failure to provide the plaintiff with proper protection proximately caused his injuries … . Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion without regard to the sufficiency of the opposing papers… .

In light of the inconsistencies as to how this accident occurred, we disagree with the Supreme Court’s determination to grant that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action. On this record, the defendants failed to demonstrate as a matter of law that the ladder provided proper protection, or that the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injuries … . Yao Zong Wu v Zhen Jia Yang, 2018 NY Slip Op 03169, Second Dept 5-2-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (THE MERE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF FELL FROM AN A-FRAME LADDER IS NOT ENOUGH TO WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF ON A LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION PROPERLY DENIED BUT DEFENDANT’S MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/LADDERS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, THE MERE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF FELL FROM AN A-FRAME LADDER IS NOT ENOUGH TO WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF ON A LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION PROPERLY DENIED BUT DEFENDANT’S MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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