BETWEEN DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA AND SENTENCING, THE COURT HELD A HEARING ON WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING PURSUANT TO THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS JUSTICE ACT (DVSJA); AT THE HEARING DEFENDANT TESTIFIED SHE ACTED IN SELF DEFENSE WHEN SHE STABBED THE VICTIM; THAT TESTIMONY TRIGGERED THE NEED FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION BY THE JUDGE; THE MAJORITY APPLIED AN EXCEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT TO CONSIDER THE APPEAL AND REVERSE; TWO DISSENTERS ARGUED THE EXCEPTION TO THE PRESEVATION REQUIREMENT DID NOT APPLY (THIRD DEPT).
The Third Department, reversing defendant’s conviction by guilty plea, over a two-justice dissent, determined defendant raised a question whether defendant stabbed the victim in self-defense in open court between the plea and sentencing which the judge was required to, but failed to explore. The majority applied an exception to the preservation requirement triggered when an element of the crime is negated by the defendant in open court between the plea and the sentencing. Although nothing in the in the plea colloquy negated an element of the crime, during the post-plea hearing on defendant’s application for alternative sentencing pursuant to the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) defendant testified she acted in self defense. The two dissenters argued the exception to the preservation requirement did not apply and the appeal should not have been considered:
Defendant made no statements during the plea colloquy or at sentencing that negated an element of the crimes to which she pleaded guilty, raised the possibility of a particular defense or suggested an involuntary plea so as to implicate the narrow exception to the preservation rule … . That said, the narrow exception to the preservation rule is implicated whenever a defendant “negate[s] an element of the crime to which a plea has been entered or make[s] [a] statement[ ] suggestive of an involuntary plea” in open court between the plea and sentencing, obliging the trial court to “conduct a further inquiry or give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea” … .
From the dissent:
… [D]efendant’s statements during the DVSJA hearing did not signify a lack of understanding about the nature of the charges to which she pleaded guilty or that her plea was involuntary. We are mindful that defendant’s statements during the hearing suggest that she had a potential justification defense, but the hearing was contemplated by the plea agreement itself, the statements were made for the purpose of establishing defendant’s entitlement to a reduced sentence under Penal Law § 60.12 and defendant twice reaffirmed her plea during the hearing. Notably, at the end of the hearing, defense counsel expressly stated that defendant had “knowingly plea[ded guilty to the indictment.” Under these particular circumstances and when considered in context, defendant’s postplea statements “did not raise a legitimate question about the voluntariness of [defendant’s] plea” … so as to impose upon the court a duty of further inquiry to ensure that the plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent … . People v Brown-Shook, 2026 NY Slip Op 00172, Third Dept 1-16-26
Practice Point: Here the defendant pled guilty and moved for an alternative sentence under the DVSJA. At the DVSJA hearing she testified she stabbed the victim in self defense. There is a narrow exception to the preservation requirement when a defendant negates an element of the crime in open court between pleading guilty and sentencing. Over a two-justice dissent, the majority applied the preservation exception and reversed on the ground the judge did not explore the possibility defendant had acted in self defense.