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PURSUANT TO THE “HUMANE ALTERNATIVES TO LONG-TERM CONFINEMENT ACT (HALT ACT),” AN INMATE WHO IS FACING SEGREGATED CONFINEMENT HAS A RIGHT TO THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL AT THE DISPOSITIONAL PHASE OF THE DISCIPLINARY HEARING (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Powers, determined that the incarcerated petitioner had a right to have his attorney present during the dispositional phase of the disciplinary hearing after he was found guilty of possession of a weapon. The Hearing Officer had determined counsel’s presence was “no longer necessary” in violation of the “Humane Alternatives to Long-Term Solitary Confinement Act” (the HALT Act—Correction Law 137):

… [F]ollowing the passage of the HALT Act, Correction Law § 137 provides that an incarcerated individual “shall be permitted to be represented” during a disciplinary hearing that may result in placement in segregated confinement “by any attorney or law student, or” with certain limitations, “any paralegal or incarcerated person” (Correction Law § 137 [6] [l]). The pertinent regulations have since also been amended to specify that “[w]here an incarcerated individual is placed in, or pending possible placement in, segregated confinement pending a disciplinary hearing or superintendent’s hearing, such incarcerated individual shall be permitted to be represented by,” as is relevant here, “an attorney, having good standing, admitted to practice in any state” (7 NYCRR 251-5.2 [a] [1]).

Therefore, pursuant to both statute and regulation, if an incarcerated individual so chooses, he or she is entitled to have representation present during a disciplinary hearing when the permissible sanctions include the imposition of segregated confinement. Contrary to the Hearing Officer’s determination, the dispositional phase is an integral aspect of the disciplinary hearing and the statutory and regulatory right to representation at issue here extends to that phase of the hearing. Matter of Wingate v Martuscello, 2025 NY Slip Op 07048, Third Dept 12-18-25

 

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