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INDIGENT PARTIES WHO ARE ASSIGNED COUNSEL IN FAMILY COURT PROCEEDINGS HAVE A RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL; HERE IN THESE PERMANENT-NEGLECT/TERMINATION-OF-PARENTAL-RIGHTS PROCEEDINGS, THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED MOTHER DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE; THERE WAS A THREE-JUDGE DISSENT (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, over a two-judge dissent, determined mother had a right to, but did not receive, effective assistance of counsel in the permanent neglect proceeding in Family Court. Assigned counsel did not speak to mother until after the fact-finding hearing had begun, was unprepared, and did not request an adjournment. During the fact-finding hearing, mother asked to represent herself and waived her right counsel. Assigned counsel remained in a standby capacity. After the fact-finding hearing, the court moved directly to the dispositional hearing. During the dispositional hearing mother’s request for representation was denied:

… [D]espite being assigned more than two months earlier, counsel had not spoken to the mother before the hearing to terminate her parental rights had already begun. We cannot determine based on this record why counsel and the mother did not speak prior to the fact-finding hearing, and the court did not inquire, so the reasons for that lack of communication are pure speculation. Even assuming … that counsel attempted to contact the mother but was unsuccessful, there is no strategic or other reasonable explanation for counsel’s failure to request an adjournment of the proceeding so that he could speak to his client before the fact-finding hearing began, especially when the mother indicated that she would not be surrendering her parental rights. Before the mother indicated that she would not, in fact, surrender her parental rights, counsel could have legitimately thought that the fact-finding hearing would not go forward. However, once it was clear that the hearing was about to commence, counsel should have requested an adjournment to speak to his client about the proceeding and its implications. Counsel’s failure to do so lacks a strategic or legitimate explanation.

Counsel also appeared unprepared, questioning whether the records that were subpoenaed were available to be reviewed and announcing that he would remain silent during the hearing, only to be admonished by the court that he was required to participate. In addition, the court, faced with a record that showed counsel’s unpreparedness to proceed due to lack of communication, continued forward with the fact-finding hearing and the dispositional hearing even after it was clear that the mother did not understand the proceedings, denied the mother’s subsequent request to be represented by counsel even though the court told the mother she could change her mind about self-representation, and gave the mother’s standby counsel only five minutes in which to explain the proceedings to her. Matter of Parker J. (Beth F.), 2025 NY Slip Op 06533, CtApp 11-25-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into what constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of an assigned counsel representing an indigent parent in permanent neglect and termination of parental rights proceedings.

 

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