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IN THIS DRAM SHOP ACT CASE, DEFENDANT BAR DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT DRIVER WAS NOT VISIBLY INTOXICATED WHEN SERVED AND THEREFORE DID NOT MEET ITS INITIAL BURDEN FOR ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION; A TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED DEFENDANT BAR MET ITS INITIAL BURDEN, THUS SHIFITNG THE BURDEN TO THE PLANTIFF (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined, in this Dram Shop Act case, defendant bar did not demonstrate defendant driver was not visibly intoxicated when served alcohol. The dissenters argued the bar met its initial burden on its motion for summary judgment:

In support of the motion, defendant submitted evidence that, throughout the evening preceding the accident, plaintiff and a group of others—including the driver—were out celebrating and consumed alcohol. Just before they went to defendant’s bar, the entire group had been denied entry into another establishment because some members of the group were visibly intoxicated. At defendant’s bar, the group was served and consumed more alcohol. Although defendant’s owner and employees testified that defendant’s employees as a general practice do not allow visibly intoxicated persons to drink alcohol and that the employees were trained to recognize visibly intoxicated people, no one could specifically recall seeing the driver, nor could they describe the driver’s level of intoxication on the night at issue … . In fact, none of the deposition testimony submitted by defendant was from an individual physically present inside the bar at the time the driver was allegedly served.

From the dissent:

…. [W]e conclude that defendant met its initial burden on the motion by submitting uncontradicted deposition testimony “in which its employees averred that they had no recollection that [the driver] was visibly intoxicated while she was . . . at [defendant]’s establishment” … . … [D]efendant’s employees testified that staff are trained to recognize visibly intoxicated persons; that bartenders do not allow visibly intoxicated persons to drink alcohol; and that bouncers do not allow visibly intoxicated persons to enter the bar, that they make rounds inside the establishment in order to observe the patrons and determine if anyone is visibly intoxicated, and that they signal the bartenders to stop serving alcohol to patrons who are visibly intoxicated. Additionally, a bouncer testified that he recalled conducting “rounds inside the establishment” on the night of the incident and that he observed the patrons, as was his routine, but did not “signal[ ] to the bartenders that anyone was intoxicated.” Gonzalez v City of Buffalo, 2025 NY Slip Op 06423, Fourth Dept 11-21-25

Practice Point: In moving for summary judgment in a Dram Shop Act case, the defendant bar had the initial burden to demonstrate it did not serve a visibly intoxicated defendant. Because the majority concluded that initial burden was not met, the summary judgment motion was denied without the need to consider the plaintiff’s response. The dissent disagreed with the majority and argued the bar had met its initial burden.​

 

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