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PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST FOR SPECIFIED DISCOVERY IN OPPOSITION TO AN “ANTI-SLAPP-LAW” MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the request for specified discovery made by plaintiffs with respect to the SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public petition and participation) defense should have been granted:

… [I]n opposing defendants’ motion to dismiss … , plaintiffs made an alternative request for specified discovery pursuant to CPLR 3211(g)(3). In essence, a CPLR 3211(g) motion is an accelerated summary judgment motion brought in the context of a SLAPP claim … . The statute makes special provision for discovery upon an application by the party opposing the CPLR 3211(g) motion. Such discovery is tailored to aid a party in summoning “facts essential to justify its opposition” to a SLAPP claim (CPLR 3211[g][3]) and thereby show a substantial basis for their claims … .

As required by the statute, plaintiffs made their request for specified discovery under oath and with a detailed list of the depositions they seek in ascertaining who contacted the FBI, who knew what about the investigation, and when (see CPLR 3311[g][3]). Plaintiffs seek to substantiate their theory that defendants themselves instigated the FBI investigation to provide a predicate for the guardianship proceeding.

Supreme Court incorrectly held that the anti-SLAPP law did not apply, but, if it did, plaintiffs had established a substantial basis for their claims on the existing record. The court thus never reached plaintiffs’ alternative request for discovery. The parties did not brief the issue of specified discovery on the appeal. Under these circumstances, we modify Supreme Court’s denial of the motion to dismiss directed at the SLAPP claims and remand the action for discovery under CPLR 3211(g)(3) prefatory to determination of the dismissal motion. Kohler v West End 84 Units LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 05042, First Dept 9-23-25

Practice Point: CPLR 3311[g][3] provides for discovery in the face of a motion to dismiss pursuant the anti-SLAPP statute. Here the judge’s failure to grant the discovery request required remittal.

 

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