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DEFENDANT MOVED TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION ARGUING HIS ATTORNEY WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR WAIVING AN INTERPRETER; COUNTY COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD A HEARING ON THE MOTION; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court, over a two-justice dissent. determined County Court should have held a hearing on defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction. Defendant argued defense attorney’s waiver of an interpreter constituted ineffective assistance. Defendant’s ineffective-assistance argument on direct appeal had been rejected, but the motion to vacate properly raised the waiver of an interpreter as a new issue:

We agree with defendant that County Court erred in its determination that defendant’s claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel was procedurally barred pursuant to CPL 440.10 (2) (a) … . Although on direct appeal we rejected defendant’s contention that he was denied effective assistance of counsel … , we conclude that his present contentions are properly raised by way of a CPL 440.10 motion because they concern matters outside the record that was before us on his direct appeal … . Defendant’s motion contained sufficient evidence, including “sworn allegations . . by . . . defendant or by another person or persons” (CPL 440.30 [1] [a]), demonstrating that a hearing is necessary to determine whether trial counsel’s waiver of an interpreter for defendant adversely affected defendant’s right to meaningfully participate in his own defense … . Specifically, defendant submitted evidence that, although he was able to navigate conversational topics in English, he required the assistance of an interpreter when discussing more technical or esoteric topics and that he had in fact utilized the assistance of an interpreter at all but one court appearance prior to his trial counsel waiving such services for defendant just prior to trial. “Although the evidence in support of the motion does not ‘conclusively substantiate[ ] by unquestionable documentary proof’ that vacatur is required due to a violation of defendant’s right to [effective assistance of] counsel . . . , it is nonetheless suggestive of that fact” … . Defendant is therefore entitled to a hearing “on his entire claim of ineffective assistance of counsel inasmuch as such a claim constitutes a single, unified claim that must be assessed in totality” … . People v Anwar, 2025 NY Slip Op 04301, Fourth Dept 7-25-25

Practice Point: This decision gives some insight into when the court must conduct a hearing on a motion to vacate a conviction. The discussion is enriched by a two-justice dissent.

 

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