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THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD’S CONCLUSION THAT CLAIMAINT IS NOT ENTITLED TO PERMANENT-TOTAL-DISABILITY STATUS BASED UPON EXTREME FINANCIAL HARDSHIP; MATTER REMITTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board and remitting the matter, determined the Board did not make findings which justified its ruling that claimant was not entitled to relief based upon extreme financial hardship:

Workers’ Compensation Law § 35 (3) provides that, “[i]n cases where the loss of wage-earning capacity is greater than [75%], a claimant may request, within the year prior to the scheduled exhaustion of indemnity benefits under [Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 (3) (w)], that the [B]oard reclassify the claimant to permanent total disability or total industrial disability due to factors reflecting extreme hardship” … . “[A] claimant seeking reclassification based upon extreme hardship must demonstrate financial hardship beyond the ordinary and existing in a very high degree” … . * * *

Claimant’s C-35 form, the accompanying submissions and her hearing testimony demonstrate that her essential monthly expenses — consisting of rent, utilities and basic amenities — would exceed her monthly income of $1,280, received from Social Security disability, by more than $300 if her workers’ compensation benefits are ended. This deficit results in claimant’s inability to cover even basic grocery expenses upon the expiration of her workers’ compensation benefits. Significantly, the Board made no finding that claimant’s income would be sufficient to meet her essential living expenses, nor is there substantial evidence in the record to support any such conclusion. * * * … [T]he Board did no analysis, and gave no explanation, as to how the future reduction of claimant’s income to an amount significantly below the most basic of living expenses did not result in an extreme financial hardship. Claimant now lives alone in a modest apartment and uses a high-mileage, nearly 20-year-old vehicle, for which she pays a nominal monthly parking fee. Upon this record, substantial evidence does not support the Board’s determination that claimant failed to demonstrate extreme financial hardship warranting a reclassification pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 35 (3) and, thus, we reverse. Matter of Martin v D’Agostino Supermarkets Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 04059, Third Dept 7-3-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a discussion of the criteria for permanent-total-disability status based upon extreme financial hardship.

 

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