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PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEFAMATION PER SE (DEFENDANT ALLEGEDLY STATED PLAINTIFF ENGAGED IN MONEY LAUNDERING); ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED THE ACTION INVOLVED “PUBLIC PETITION AND PARTICIPATION” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SLAPP STATUTE, PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED THE DEFAMATION ACTION HAD A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS IN LAW; THEREFORE THE SLAPP STATUTE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had stated a cause of action for defamation and defendant was not entitled to dismissal of the complaint pursuant to the SLAPP statute (strategic lawsuit against public participation—Civil Rights Law section 70-a(1)(a)). Plaintiff operated a marina under a 60-year lease from the National Park Service, a US governmental agency. Defendant allegedly told plaintiff’s customer that plaintiff was engaged in money-laundering:

… [D]efendant satisfied his initial burden of establishing that this action is an action involving public petition and participation, since it involves a claim based upon “lawful conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest” (id. § 76-a[1][a][2]).  * * * … [T]he defendant established that the causes of action were asserted in connection with an issue of public interest, as the defendant allegedly accused an entity operating with the authority of a governmental agency of criminal conduct … .

Since the defendant established that this action constitutes an action involving public petition and participation, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the causes of action had a substantial basis in law … .

… [T]he defendant’s alleged statement that the plaintiff “is engaged in money laundering” did not constitute pure nonactionable opinion … . * * * …[T]he complaint alleged that the defendant acted with “actual malice” or reckless disregard as to whether the statements were true or false … . … [T]he complaint was not required to allege special damages, since it asserted a cause of action alleging defamation per se based upon allegations that the defendant made statements charging the plaintiff with a serious crime or tending to injure it in its trade, business, or profession … . Thus, the plaintiff established that the cause of action alleging defamation per se had a substantial basis in law … . Moonbeam Gateway Mar., LLC v Tai Chan, 2025 NY Slip Op 03802, Second Dept 6-25-25

Practice Point: The motion court dismissed the defamation action on the ground it was precluded by the SLAPP statute. However the Second Department held that plaintiff had demonstrated the defamation action had a substantial basis in law. Therefore defendant did not demonstrate entitlement to dismissal under the SLAPP statute.

 

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