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ALTHOUGH THE INFORMANT WHO CALLED 911 ABOUT A “MAN WITH A GUN” WAS KNOWN TO THE POLICE AND MAY BE PRESUMED TO BE RELIABLE, THERE WAS NO TESTIMONY AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING ABOUT THE BASIS FOR THE INFORMANT’S KNOWLEDGE; THEREFORE THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE THE POLICE HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP THE DEFENDANT; THE SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing County Court, determined the suppression motion should have been granted. Although the informant who made the 911 call was known to the police, there was no testimony at the suppression hearing about the basis of the informant’s knowledge. The stop of defendant’s vehicle for failure to use a turn signal did not justify removing defendant from the vehicle and handcuffing him:

When the People seek to rely on information provided by an informant to establish the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a vehicle stop, “‘it [is] essential that at least some showing be made of the basis of the informant’s knowledge'” … . Where there is no testimony demonstrating how the informant knew the defendant was engaged in illegality, such as the possession of a weapon, reasonable suspicion cannot be found … .

… Neither the sergeant nor the officer testified as to how the informant, who had called the 911 emergency number, knew that the defendant had a gun. Therefore, the People failed to demonstrate that the information provided by the informant constituted “more than unsubstantiated rumor, unfounded accusation or conclusory characterization” … .

In the absence of the People eliciting testimony at the suppression hearing that sufficiently explained how the informant knew the defendant was in possession of a weapon, the County Court erred in concluding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant … . Moreover, while the informant did identify the defendant from across the street, this identification occurred well after the defendant had been stopped and detained by the officers. “‘Where a police encounter is not justified in its inception, it cannot be validated by a subsequently acquired suspicion'” … .

… [W]hile the informant, who was known to the responding officers, may be presumed to be reliable, the basis of his knowledge was not sufficiently established at the suppression hearing. People v Thomison, 2025 NY Slip Op 02938, Second Dept 5-14-25

Practice Point: At a suppression hearing, the People have the burden to prove the legality of the police conduct. Where an informant known to the police calls 911 to report a “man with a gun,” the reliability of the informant may be presumed. But the People must still prove the basis for the informant’s knowledge. Where, as here, there is no testimony demonstrating how the informant learned about the “man with a gun,” the People have not met their burden of proof.

 

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