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CONFINEMENT IN A RESIDENTIAL MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT UNIT (RMHU) FOR 17 HOURS A DAY, WITH AT LEAST SEVEN HOURS OF OUT-OF-CELL TIME PER DAY, FOR MORE THAN THREE DAYS, DOES NOT VIOLATE THE HUMANE ALTERNATIVES TO LONG-TERM SOLITARY CONFINEMENT ACT (HALT ACT) (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Pritzker, determined the sanctions imposed upon petitioner, an incarcerated person with serious mental illness, did not violate the Humane Alternatives to Long-Term Solitary Confinement Act (HALT Act) but did violate the Special Housing Unit Exclusion Law (SHU Exclusion Law):

… [P]etitioner remained in the RMHU [residential mental health treatment unit] where he received at least seven hours of out-of-cell time, therefore he was not in segregated confinement, which is defined as “the confinement of an incarcerated individual in any form of cell confinement for more than [17] hours a day” (Correction Law § 2 [23]). * * * Therefore, based on the foregoing, DOCCS [Department of Corrections and Community Supervision] did not violate Correction Law § 137 (6) (k) (ii) by placing petitioner in the RMHU longer than three days without the requisite findings under the HALT Act.

However … we do find that the disciplinary sanctions, as written, violated the SHU Exclusion Law as set forth in Correction Law § 401. To that end, Correction Law § 401 provides that “[a]n incarcerated individual . . . shall not be sanctioned with segregated confinement for misconduct [in an RMHTU], or removed from the unit and placed in segregated confinement or a[n RRU (residential rehabilitation unit)], except in exceptional circumstances where such incarcerated individual’s conduct poses a significant and unreasonable risk to . . . safety . . . and . . . has been found to have committed an act or acts defined in [Correction Law § 137 [k] [6] [ii]]” (Correction Law § 401 [5] …). “Because the statute is phrased in the disjunctive” … , DOCCS must find that exceptional circumstances existed and a Correction Law § 137 (6) (k) (ii) act occurred if either 1) the incarcerated individual is sanctioned with segregated confinement for misconduct on the unit or 2) the incarcerated individual is removed and placed in segregated confinement or an RRU. Here, the former applies as petitioner was sanctioned, in writing, with segregated confinement in the RMHU but was not found, in a written determination, to have committed an act pursuant to Correction Law § 137 (6) (k) (ii), a fact which is uncontested by either party. Thus, the written disciplinary sanction was in violation of the SHU Exclusion Law. Therefore, the disciplinary sanctions imposed upon petitioner must be annulled. Matter of Walker v Commissioner, N.Y. State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 2025 NY Slip Op 02834, Third Dept 5-8-25

 

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