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THE “EVEN YEAR ELECTION LAW” (EYEL) IS CONSTITUTIONAL, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the Even Year Election Law (EYEL) does not violate the New York Constitution or the United States Constitution. The decision is complex and cannot be fairly summarized here:

The EYEL amended provisions of County Law § 400, Town Law § 80, Village Law § 17-1703-a (4), and Municipal Home Rule Law § 34 (3) such that elections for most county, town, and village officials would be held on even-numbered years, and would no longer be held on odd-numbered years, effective January 1, 2025 … . Exceptions were made for the offices of town justice, sheriff, county clerk, district attorney, family court judge, county court judge, and surrogate court judge — each of which has a term of office provided in the New York Constitution … — as well as town and county offices with preexisting three-year terms, all offices in towns coterminous with villages, and all offices in counties located in New York City … . Additionally, a new subsection (h) was added to Municipal Home Rule Law § 34 (3) to preclude county charters from superseding the newly enacted County Law § 400 (8).

The EYEL purports to encourage an increased voter turnout in local elections now scheduled in odd-numbered years, which are years without federal or state-wide elections on the ballot, consistent with the State’s public policy of “[e]ncourag[ing] participation in the elective franchise by all eligible voters to the maximum extent” … , and the mandate of the New York Board of Elections to “take all appropriate steps to encourage the broadest possible voter participation in elections” … .  County of Onondaga v State of New York, 2025 NY Slip Op 02818, Fourth Dept 5-7-25

 

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