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THE RELIGIOUS NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION, THE OWNER OF THE RESIDENCE PROVIDED FOR THE TORAH READER AND HIS FAMILY, WAS ENTITLED TO A REAL-PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Ventura, determined the not-for-profit religious corporation was entitled to an exemption from real property tax for a residence used by Marcus, the Torah reader, and his family:​

This appeal provides this Court with an opportunity to clarify the standards courts should consider when deciding whether a covered not-for-profit corporation is entitled to a full tax exemption pursuant to RPTL 420-a for property allegedly utilized primarily in furtherance of exempt purposes. The circumstances presented here involve an Orthodox Jewish religious corporation seeking an exemption for a residential property used, inter alia, to house its Torah reader and his family. … [W]e conclude … that the petitioner demonstrated that the subject property was used primarily in furtherance of its religious purposes during the 2015 tax year. Therefore, the Supreme Court should have granted the petitioner’s motion for summary judgment on the petition to review the real property tax assessment for that year. * * *

… [T]he petitioner’s submissions established that it offered Marcus housing within walking distance of the synagogue in order to continue to retain his expert services as a Torah reader, as his religious beliefs prohibited him from driving to the synagogue on the Sabbath and on Jewish holy days, and he had a growing family which made walking from his prior apartment impractical … . The petitioner’s rabbi also stated that, upon learning that Marcus could not continue in his role as Torah reader without residing closer to the synagogue, “[t]he congregation was unable to identify any qualified Torah [r]eader within walking distance [thereof].” Considering … that “[t]he requirement of reading from the Torah” during services “is absolute and cannot be waived,” as explained by the rabbi, the petitioner’s religious “goal[s]” were “advance[d]” by providing Marcus with housing closer to the synagogue … . Matter of Harrison Orthodox Minyan, Inc. v Town/Village of Harrison, 2025 NY Slip Op 01634, Second Dept 3-19-25

Practice Point: Here a not-for-profit religious corporation was entitled to an exemption from real property tax for a residence provided to the Torah reader and his family because the residence was used “primarily in furtherance of its religious purposes” during the relevant tax year.​

 

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