You are here: / / ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT STATE PAROLE OFFICER WAS DRIVING A STATE-OWNED VEHICLE...
, , ,

ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT STATE PAROLE OFFICER WAS DRIVING A STATE-OWNED VEHICLE AND ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HER EMPLOYMENT WHEN THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT OCCURRED, PLAINTIFF PROPERLY BROUGHT SUIT IN SUPREME COURT AS OPPOSED TO THE COURT OF CLAIMS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the Correction Law did not require that plaintiff bring this traffic accident case involving a Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) parole officer in the Court of Claims. Although the defendant officer was driving a State-owned vehicle and was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident, the lawsuit was properly brought in Supreme Court:

“Not every suit against an officer of the State, however, is a suit against the State” … . “A suit against a State officer will be held to be one which is really asserted against the State when it arises from actions or determinations of the officer made in his or her official role and involves rights asserted, not against the officer individually, but solely against the State” … . If, however, “the suit against the State agent or officer is in tort for damages arising from the breach of a duty owed individually by such agent or officer directly to the injured party, the State is not the real party in interest—even though it could be held secondarily liable for the tortious acts under respondeat superior” … .

Correction Law § 24 (2) provides that claims for damages “arising out of any act done or the failure to perform any act within the scope of the employment and in the discharge of the duties” of any State employee shall be brought in the Court of Claims as claims against the State. Thus, Correction Law § 24 “places actions for money damages against [DOCCS] employees within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims only where the conduct alleged is within the scope of the officer’s employment and in the discharge of his or her official duties” … .

Here, the complaint asserts a single cause of action based on allegations that defendant operated the vehicle in a negligent manner, i.e., that defendant’s alleged negligence arises from her violation of a duty she owed plaintiff as a fellow driver, and not as a DOCCS employee. Thus, plaintiff’s action is “against . . . defendant individually for an alleged breach of a duty of care owed by the defendant directly to [plaintiff], and not one against State officers as representatives of the State in their official capacity which had to be brought in the Court of Claims pursuant to Correction Law § 24” … . Maiorana v Green, 2025 NY Slip Op 01518, Fourth Dept 12-14-25

Practice Point: Although the defendant parole officer was acting within the scope of her employment when she was driving the state-owned vehicle, the traffic accident allegedly breached a duty of care owed directly to the plaintiff by the defendant as a fellow driver, not as a state employee.

 

You might also like
RECORD IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DETERMINE HOW THE TRIAL COURT HANDLED NOTES FROM THE JURY, NEW TRIAL ORDERED; CHALLENGE TO THE PROPRIETY OF HOLDING A RECONSTRUCTION HEARING IS MOOT AND WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (FOURTH DEPT).
Petitioners Did Not Have Standing to Contest County’s Negative Declaration After a SEQRA Review
THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE SNOW PLOW WAS “ENGAGED IN HIGHWAY WORK” AT THE TIME OF THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT; THEREFORE THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT CONCERNING WHETHER THE HIGHER “RECKLESS DISREGARD” STANDARD OF CARE APPLIED; THE STATE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
SHANE, A CO-DEFENDANT WITH HIS PARENTS WITH WHOM HE LIVED, WAS NOT DISQUALIFIED FROM ACCEPTING SERVICE ON BEHALF OF HIS PARENTS DUE TO A CONFLICT OF INTEREST; THE ACTION AGAINST THE PARENTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN VACATED BASED ON A LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFENDANTS “EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AMERICA (ELCA)” AND “UPSTATE NEW YORK SYNOD OF THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AMERICA (SYNOD)” HAD THE POWER TO DISCIPLINE AND TERMINATE A PASTOR ACCUSED OF ABUSE; THEREFORE THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THOSE DEFENDANTS WERE THE PASTOR’S EMPLOYERS; THE NEGLIGENT HIRING, SUPERVISION AND RETENTION CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).
Preliminary Injunction Prohibiting the Levying of Deficit Assessments by the Workers’ Compensation Board Properly Granted
THE OFFICER WHO CONVINCED DEFENDANT TO CONSENT TO THE SEARCH TOLD THE DEFENDANT HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO APPLY FOR A WARRANT BUT DEFENDANT WOULD BE DETAINED UNTIL THE WARRANT WAS PROCURED; BECAUSE THE POLICE DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR A SEARCH WARRANT, THE OFFICER’S STATEMENT WAS MISLEADING; DEFENDANT’S CONSENT TO SEARCH WAS NOT VOLUNTARILY GIVEN (FOURTH DEPT).
THE “FOLLOW THE SETTLEMENTS” DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO A REINSURER WHERE THE PAYMENTS MADE BY THE PRIMARY INSURER WERE CLEARLY BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE ORIGINAL POLICY (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

FATHER’S RIGHT TO FILE FUTURE PETITIONS FOR MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY SHOULD... THE COMPLAINT DID NOT SUFFICIIENTLY ALLEGE DEFENDANT ASSISTED LIVING FACILITY...