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THE SIX-MONTH WAITING PERIOD ASSOCIATED WITH THE REVIVAL OF OTHERWISE TIME-BARRED ACTIONS PURSUANT TO THE CHILD VICTIMS ACT IS NEITHER A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS NOR A CONDITION PRECEDENT; THEREFORE, PURSUANT TO FEDERAL PROCEDURAL LAW, THE SECOND CIRCUIT MAY RULE THAT DEFENDANT FORFEITED THE RIGHT TO A TIMELINESS DISMISSAL OF THE FEDERAL COMPLAINT (BASED ON THE ARGUMENT PLAINTIFF’S ACTION WAS PREMATURE) BY FAILING TO TIMELY RAISE THE ISSUE (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, answering a certified question from the Second Circuit, determined the six-month waiting period associated with the revival of negligence actions pursuant to the Child Victims Act, creating a two-year window for the filing of otherwise time-barred actions, was neither a statute of limitations nor a condition precedent. Therefore, under federal procedural law, the defendant’s failure to timely raise the issue in the federal proceedings forfeited his right to dismissal of the complaint on the ground plaintiff’s action was premature:

In 2019, the legislature passed the Child Victims Act (CVA), which provided that previously time-barred tort claims based on sex offenses against children could be brought within a specified time (see CPLR 214-g). As amended, the CVA provided that such a claim “is hereby revived, and action thereon may be commenced not earlier than six months after, and not later than two years and six months after” February 14, 2019—i.e., “the effective date of this section” (id.). In other words, actions on these claims could be commenced “not earlier than” August 14, 2019 and “not later than” August 14, 2021. * * *

On April 26, 2019, plaintiff commenced a negligence action in state court against defendant, alleging that a teacher employed in one of defendant’s schools engaged in unlawful sexual conduct with her in and around 2009 and 2010, when she was a student under age 17, and that, in 2013, as a result of that conduct, the teacher pleaded guilty to rape in the third degree. * * *

On September 3, 2021, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on statute of limitations grounds. Defendant argued, for the first time, that the complaint must be dismissed because plaintiff commenced her action before CPLR 214-g’s period for filing claims began. Significantly, defendant filed its motion less than three weeks after the statutory period for filing claims ended, meaning that plaintiff would be unable to recommence a timely action if defendant’s motion succeeded. Jones v Cattaraugus-Little Val. Cent. Sch. Dist., 2025 NY Slip Op 01007, CtApp 2-20-25

Practice Point: Here the Court of Appeals, answering the Second Circuit’s question, determined the six-month waiting period for an otherwise time-barred action brought pursuant to the Child Victims Act was not a statute of limitations or a condition precedent. Therefore the Second Circuit was free to deny a federal defendant’s motion to dismiss the Child Victims Act complaint on the ground the action was premature.

 

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