DESIGNATING DEFENDANT A SEXUALLY VIOLENT OFFENDER BASED SOLELY UPON THE FACT HE WAS REQUIRED TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER IN PENNSYLVANIA VIOLATED DUE PROCESS; HOWEVER THE MATTER WAS REMITTED TO DETERMINE WHETHER ANY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA FELONIES WOULD HAVE CONSTITUTED A SEXUALLY VIOLENT OFFENSE IN NEW YORK, A QUESTION NOT RAISED BEFORE COUNTY COURT (FOURTH DEPT).
The Fourth Department reversed defendant’s SORA designation as a sexually violent offender based upon Pennsylvania convictions as a violation of due process, but remitted the matter to Count Court for consideration of the issue under another provision of the Correction Law:
… [W]e conclude, based on the reasoning set forth by the plurality in People v Malloy (228 AD3d 1284, 1287-1291 [4th Dept 2024]), that there is no rational basis for designating defendant a sexually violent offender solely on the ground of his conviction of the Pennsylvania felony sex offenses requiring him to register as a sex offender in that jurisdiction … . Defendant has therefore met his burden of showing that the imposition of the sexually violent offender designation under the second disjunctive clause of Correction Law § 168-a (3) (b), as applied to him, violates his constitutional right to substantive due process. Consequently, we reverse the order insofar as appealed from and vacate that designation.
However, we note that the issue whether the essential elements of any of the Pennsylvania felonies were the statutory equivalent of a sexually violent offense in New York under the essential elements test set out in the first disjunctive clause of Correction Law § 168-a (3) (b) was never raised before County Court. We decline to consider that alternative basis for affirmance, sua sponte, for the first time on appeal … . We therefore remit to County Court to consider whether any of the Pennsylvania felonies includes all of the essential elements of a sexually violent offense set forth in Correction Law § 168-a (3) (a) … . People v Boldorff, 2025 NY Slip Op 00765, Fourth Dept 2-7-25
Practice Point: A sexually-violent-offender designation based solely upon the fact defendant was required to register as a sex offender in Pennsylvania was deemed unconstitutional here. But the matter was remitted for a determination whether any of the Pennsylvania felonies would have constituted a sexually violent offense in New York.