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THE CONTRACTOR THAT HIRED THE SUBCONTRACTOR FOR WHICH THE INJURED PLAINTIFF WORKED WAS THE CONDOMINIUM DEFENDANTS’ STATUTORY AGENT AND THEREFORE CAN BE HELD LIABLE IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant Chelsea, the contractor that hired the subcontractor, Prince, for which the injured plaintiff worked, was the statutory agent of the condominium defendants in this Labor Law 240(1) case. Therefore the action against Chelsea should not have been dismissed:

Supreme Court improperly dismissed Chelsea from this action on the ground that it is not the condo defendants’ statutory agent for purposes of Labor Law § 240(1) liability. Chelsea was the only contractor that the condo defendants retained to perform their window-washing project, and Chelsea cannot escape liability under Labor Law § 240(1) because it delegated the work by subcontracting it to Prince, plaintiff’s employer … . Chelsea’s authority to supervise and control the work is also demonstrated by its subcontracting the work to Prince, and whether Chelsea actually supervised plaintiff’s work is irrelevant … . Barreto v Board of Mgrs. of 545 W. 110th St. Condominium, 2025 NY Slip Op 00185, First Dept 1-14-25

Practice Point: Liability under Labor Law 240(1) extends to the statutory agent of the property owner, here the contractor that hired the subcontractor for which the injured plaintiff worked.

 

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THE TREE WELL IN THE SIDEWALK WHERE PLAINTIFF TRIPPED AND FELL WAS THE RESPONSIBILTY... COUNSELING OR TREATMENT SHOULD NOT BE MADE A CONDITION FOR ANY FUTURE MODIFICATION...