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AT SENTENCING THE PROSECUTOR REFERENCED EXCULPATORY STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO DEFENDANT IN THE PRESENTENCE REPORT BUT, WHEN GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY, NEITHER DEFENDANT NOR DEFENSE COUNSEL ADDRESSED THE ISSUE; NOTWITHSTANDING THE SILENCE OF THE DEFENSE THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE INQUIRED INTO WHETHER THE GUILTY PLEA WAS KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY; THERE WAS NO NEED TO PRESERVE THE ERROR FOR APPEAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singh, determined the prosecutor’s mention of defendant’s (Dupree’s) exculpatory statements in the presentence report (PSR) required the judge to conduct an inquiry to ensure the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, despite the defendant’s and defense counsel’s failure to address the statements at sentencing. Defendant and defense counsel were asked by the judge whether they wished to address the court and both said “no.” The issue need not be preserved and was properly raised on appeal:

Before sentencing, Dupree was interviewed by the Department of Probation. He made the following statement: “I admitted to shooting someone in the leg and back and the bullet went through his chest. I was fighting with him (stranger) and was defending myself. I was drinking at the club and someone slipped something in my drink and I was leaving the club to get home. He saw me staggering and wanted to rob me.” This statement was included in the presentence report (PSR).

At sentencing, Supreme Court asked whether the parties had any factual difficulties with the PSR. The prosecution replied, “I do have some factual difficulty relating to the defendant’s statement which I do not believe there was a valid self-defense claim. In fact, it is not a valid self-defense claim. . . . So I do take issue with that part of his statement as well as his claimed intoxication.” The court then asked, “and anything for the defense?” to which defense counsel replied, “no.” The court later asked whether the defense would like to be heard as to the promised sentence and, finally, asked Dupree himself if there was anything he would like to add. Neither Dupree nor his attorney addressed the statement in the PSR or the prosecution’s comment made in open court. * * *

The prosecution … argues that if Supreme Court had to inquire further, it did so by asking if defense counsel had anything to say. Yet the Court of Appeals has never held that a court may satisfy its obligation merely by allowing the defense to speak. Neither have we. Rather, the law is clear that “the trial court has a duty to inquire further to ensure that defendant’s guilty plea is knowing and voluntary” … . People v Dupree, 2025 NY Slip Op 00199, First Dept 1-14-25

Practice Point: Here the prosecutor, at sentencing, expressed disagreement with exculpatory statements attributed to defendant in the presentence report but neither defendant nor defense counsel chose to address the issue when given the opportunity by the judge. The prosecutor’s reference to the statements triggered the need for an inquiry by the judge into whether the plea was knowing and voluntary, notwithstanding the silence of the defense. There was no need to preserve the issue for appeal.

 

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