You are here: / / THE GRAND JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON THE DEFINITION OF “IMPAIRED”...
, ,

THE GRAND JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON THE DEFINITION OF “IMPAIRED” IN THE CONTEXT OF VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1192 (4-A) (FELONY AGGRAVATED DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED); THE FOURTH DEPARTMENT DISAGREED WITH THE DEFINITION OF “IMPAIRED” ADOPTED BY THE THIRD DEPARTMENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court’s dismissal of the felony aggravated driving while intoxicated count, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Curran, determined the grand jury was properly instructed on the definition of “impaired.” The Fourth Department noted its disagreement with the Third Department on this issue:

… [T]he People correctly instructed the grand jury that the term “impaired” in the context of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (4-a) is defined as the defendant’s consumption of a combination of drugs and alcohol to the point that it “has actually impaired, to any extent, the physical and mental abilities which [the defendant] is expected to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver” … .

In reaching that conclusion, we also note our respectful disagreement with the Third Department’s decision in People v Caden N. (189 AD3d 84 [3d Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 1050 [2021]), which defined the term “impaired” in the context of drug consumption in accordance with the heightened standard typically applicable in cases of “intoxication” by alcohol … . Ultimately, we conclude that the term “impaired” should be defined consistently across the Vehicle and Traffic Law—whether in the context of impairment by alcohol or in the context of impairment by drugs or a combination of drugs and alcohol. * * *

… [T]he Court of Appeals, in Cruz, clearly defined the term “impaired” to mean—in the context of alcohol consumption—that a defendant “has actually impaired, to any extent, the physical and mental abilities which [they are] expected to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver” (48 NY2d [419] at 427 …). In defining “impaired” that way, the Court sharply distinguished the term “impaired” from the separate term “intoxication,” as used in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3), noting that the latter term denoted “a greater degree of impairment which is reached when [a] driver has voluntarily consumed alcohol to the extent that [they are] incapable of employing the physical and mental abilities which [they are] expected to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver” (Cruz, 48 NY2d [419] at 428). The Court concluded that the terms impaired and intoxicated are not interchangeable … . People v Dondorfer, 2024 NY Slip Op 06432, Fourth Dept 12-20-24

Practice Point: In the Fourth Department “impaired” in the context of felony aggravated driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law 1104 (4-a)” means impairment “to any extent [of] the physical and mental abilities which [the defendant] is expected to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver” … .

 

You might also like
THE PROSECUTOR RECOMMENDED A LEVEL ONE RISK ASSESSMENT BUT THE JUDGE ASSESSED ADDITIONAL POINTS AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING RAISING THE RISK LEVEL TO TWO; BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS NOT GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO ARGUE FOR A DOWNWARD DEPARTURE, DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW HEARING (FOURTH DEPT).
NOTICES OF DISCONTINUANCE FILED AFTER MOTIONS TO DISMISS WERE BROUGHT, BUT BEFORE RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS, WERE TIMELY.
UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS OF FACT CONCERNING WHETHER THE CONSTRUCTION OF A WHOLE FOODS STORE IN THE VICINITY OF A RECREATIONAL TRAIL AND A PUBLIC USE EASEMENT VIOLATES THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE (FOURTH DEPT). ​
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE EMPLOYER’S DIRECTIVE TO TAKE THE COVID-19 VACCINE JUSTIFIED THE TERMINATION OF PETITIONER’S EMPLOYMENT; THE ARBITRATOR’S RULING TO THAT EFFECT DID NOT VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY AND WAS NOT IRRATIONAL (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFENDANT IN THIS INTERSECTION TRAFFIC ACCIDENT HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY WHEN THE TRUCK IN WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS A PASSENGER APPARENTLY FAILED TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY AND PULLED INTO DEFENDANT’S PATH; THE MAJORITY HELD THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT SAW WHAT SHE SHOULD HAVE SEEN; THE DISSENTERS ARGUED DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FOURTH DEPT).
THE DETERIORATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FATHER AND MOTHER WAS A SUFFICIENT CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES TO WARRANT AN INQUIRY RE: FATHER’S PETITION FOR A MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY; AFTER CONSIDERING THE MERITS, THE APPELLATE COURT AWARDED SOLE CUSTODY TO FATHER (FOURTH DEPT).
SUPREME COURT PROPERLY VALIDATED 25 SIGNATURES ON THE DESIGNATING PETITION WHICH HAD BEEN INVALIDATED BY THE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, THEREBY ALLOWING THE DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE FOR COUNTY EXECUTIVE TO RUN IN THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS (FOURTH DEPT).
PLAINTIFF LOAN SERVICING COMPANY WAIVED THE TIME OF THE ESSENCE PROVISION BY ITS RELENTLESS EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE FORECLOSURE SALE TO THE HIGHEST BIDDER (TO EXACT A HIGHER PRICE); THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON PLAINTIFF WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY A WRITTEN DECISION AS REQUIRED BY THE CONTROLLING REGULATION; SANCTIONS ASPECT REMITTED (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

A HANDGUN USED AS BLUDGEON IS A “DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT” WHICH WILL... THE MUNICIPAL LAW PROVISION WHICH REQUIRES JUNK YARDS TO BE LICENSED DOES NOT...