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HERE THE PROVISIONS IN THE LETTER AGREEMENT DID NOT GIVE PLAINTIFF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO SELL THE PROPERTY (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the letter agreement did not give plaintiff an exclusive right to sell the property:

Plaintiff’s argument that the parties’ letter agreement gave it an exclusive right to sell is unavailing. To create an exclusive right to sell, a contract “must clearly and expressly provide that a commission is due upon sale by the owner or exclude the owner from independently negotiating a sale” … . The agreement here lacks express language excluding a direct conveyance by defendants, nor is that a necessary implication of its terms … . The agreement’s language requiring defendants to “inform” plaintiff if contacted about potential transactions is insufficient to create an exclusive right to sell … . Moreover, plaintiff fails to show that the agreement’s tail provision, entitling plaintiff to a fee for efforts at procuring a transaction during its engagement even if the transaction were completed only after the termination of that engagement, necessarily implied that the parties intended to create an exclusive right to sell. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co. v ObvioHealth Pte Ltd., 2024 NY Slip Op 06421, First Dept 12-19-24

Practice Point: This decision gives some insight into the criteria for conferring the exclusive right to sell property.

 

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