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BY CLICKING ON CONTRACT TERMS ON HER SMART PHONE, PLAINTIFF AGREED TO ARBITRATE HER PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM AGAINST UBER; PLAINTIFF ALLEGED INJURY AFTER AN UBER DRIVER LEFT HER OFF IN TRAFFIC (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, over a two-judge dissent, determined that plaintiff, by clicking on notifications of contract terms from Uber on her smart phone, agreed to submit her personal injury action against Uber to arbitration. Plaintiff alleged the Uber driver left her off in traffic and she was injured as a result. The opinion is too detailed to fairly summarize here. The precise language of the notifications from Uber are laid out:

On this appeal, we apply centuries-old principles of contract law to a web-based “terms of use” update containing an arbitration agreement. The parties dispute the validity of that agreement and its applicability to this personal injury action, which plaintiff commenced two months before she indicated her assent to the updated terms of use by means of a series of clicks on her smartphone.

We conclude that the “clickwrap” process Uber used to solicit plaintiff’s assent resulted in the formation of an agreement to arbitrate. Moreover, a key term of that agreement expressly delegates to an arbitrator the exclusive authority to resolve all disputes as to the applicability and enforceability of the agreement. Because plaintiff has not established that the delegation provision is invalid, her challenges to the portions of the agreement that purportedly apply to pending legal claims were properly directed to the arbitrator. Wu v Uber Tech., Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 05869, CtApp 11-25-24

Practice Point: Here plaintiff was notified by Uber of updated contract terms in a message sent to her smart phone. By “clicking” agreement to the terms on her phone’s screen, plaintiff agreed to arbitrate her personal injury action against Uber.

 

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