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THE FORECLOSURE ABUSE PREVENTION ACT (FAPA) APPLIES RETROACTIVELY TO THE 2005 DISONTINUANCE OF THE FORECLOSURE ACTION RENDERING THE ACTION COMMENCED IN 2015 TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a complex decision addressing issues not summarized here, determined the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) (CPLR 3217) applied retroactively to the 2005 voluntary discontinuance. Therefore the instant action, which was commenced in 2015, was time-barred:

The Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act … ; hereinafter FAPA) amended CPLR 3217, which governs the voluntary discontinuance of an action, to provide that “[i]n any action on an instrument described under [CPLR 213(4)], the voluntary discontinuance of such action, whether on motion, order, stipulation or by notice, shall not, in form or effect, waive, postpone, cancel, toll, extend, revive or reset the limitations period to commence an action and to interpose a claim, unless expressly prescribed by statute” … . Thus, applying FAPA, the voluntary discontinuance of the 2005 action did not serve to reset the statute of limitations … .

Wells Fargo’s contention that CPLR 3217(e), added under FAPA, was not intended to have retroactive effect is without merit. FAPA took effect “immediately,” applying “to all actions commenced on an instrument described under [CPLR 213(4)] in which a final judgment of foreclosure and sale has not been enforced” … . Thus, “[a]lthough the Legislature did not explicitly state that FAPA should apply retroactively, it clearly indicated that it should” … . Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Edwards, 2024 NY Slip Op 05368, Second Dept 10-30-24

Practice Point: The Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) was applied retroactively here to a 2005 voluntary discontinuance of the foreclosure action, rendering the action started in 2015 time-barred.​

 

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