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DEFENDANTS RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT SUPPORTING A “FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT” DEFENSE TO THE ACTION BASED UPON AN EXECUTED PROMISSORY NOTE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants raised a valid “fraud in the inducement” defense to the action seeking payment on an executed promissory note. Defendants executed the note to purchase protein powder from plaintiffs. Plaintiffs described the powder as having 23 to 25 grams of protein per 33/5 grams of powder. After the purchase defendants had the powder tested which revealed the powder contained a significantly lower percentage of protein:

“When an action is based upon an instrument for the payment of money only . . . , the plaintiff may serve with the summons a notice of motion for summary judgment and the supporting papers in lieu of a complaint” (CPLR 3213). Therefore, “[t]o prevail on [their] motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint based on a promissory note, plaintiff[s] w[ere] required to present evidence that defendant[s] executed the note and defaulted thereon” … . Plaintiffs demonstrated their prima facie burden by supplying the note at issue, signed by [defendant], and evidence of defendant’s failure to pay; therefore, the burden shifted to defendants to establish the existence of a triable issue of fact as to a bona fide defense to liability … . …

Fraud in the inducement is a defense to the enforcement of a promissory note … , and, as such, defendants were required to “allege that (1) the plaintiff made a representation or a material omission of fact which was false and the plaintiff knew to be false, (2) the misrepresentation was made for the purpose of inducing the defendant to rely upon it, (3) there was justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation or material omission, and (4) injury” … . * * *

Generally, “what constitutes reasonable reliance is always [a] nettlesome” inquiry best left to the trier of fact … . Furthermore, “[s]ummary judgment is a drastic remedy that should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of triable issues of fact” … . Panessa v Lederfeind, 2024 NY Slip Op 05252, Third Dept 10-24-24

Practice Point: Fraud in the inducement is a valid defense to an action for summary judgment based upon an instrument for the payment of money only (CPLR 3213), here a promissory note.

 

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