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IN ORDER TO KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, THE DEFENDANT NEED NOT BE INFORMED OF HIS MAXIMUM SENTENCING EXPOSURE IN YEARS; THE “SPEEDY TRIAL” TIME ASSOCIATED WITH THE JOINDER OF A CO-DEFENDANT FOR TRIAL IS CHARGED TO THE DEFENDANT, EVEN WHERE THE DEFENDANT HAD NOT YET BEEN ARRAIGNED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, over a dissenting opinion by Judge Rivera, affirming the Appellate Division, determined (1) in order to effectively waive the right to counsel, a defendant need not be informed of his maximum sentencing exposure in years, and (2) the pre-arraignment delay associated with the joinder for trial with a co-defendant is not chargeable to the People:

Defendant Anthony Blue challenges his criminal conviction for five counts of second-degree burglary. Blue argues that a criminal defendant cannot make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel unless the trial judge specifically apprises the defendant of his maximum sentencing exposure in years. Rather than imposing a bright-line rule such as this, we have said that a court must ensure a defendant is adequately warned of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation before allowing him to proceed pro se. A review of the record here confirms that Blue had such an understanding at the time he waived his right to counsel.

Blue also argues that his indictment should have been dismissed on statutory speedy-trial grounds. CPL 30.30 (4) (d), broadly speaking, excludes from the time chargeable to the People a reasonable period of delay when a defendant is joined for trial with a co-defendant. Blue contends this provision does not apply to pre-arraignment time, but the Appellate Division correctly concluded that it does. Thus the 57 days between indictment and arraignment chargeable to Blue’s co-defendant were also chargeable to Blue, even though he had not yet been arraigned. People v Blue, 2024 NY Slip Op 05175, CtApp 10-22-24

Practice Point: A defendant can effectively waive the right to counsel without being informed of his maximum sentencing exposure in years.

Practice Point: Even though defendant had not yet been arraigned, the time associated with joining a co-defendant for trial was chargeable to the defendant.

 

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