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HERE PLAINTIFF DID NOT IDENTIFY AN EXPERT WITNESS AS REQUIRED BY CPLR 3101 AND THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED; HOWEVER PLAINTIFF ALLEGED SCARRING AND BURNING DURING LASER HAIR REMOVAL AND MAY STILL BE ABLE TO PROVE ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE THROUGH THE TESTIMONY OF HIS TREATING PHYSICIAN AND OTHER EVIDENCE; THE NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that, although plaintiff was precluded from offering expert evidence and therefore could not prove medical malpractice, the negligence cause of action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff alleged scarring and burns caused by laser hair removal:

The Supreme Court erred in dismissing the negligence cause of action on the ground that the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case in the absence of the testimony of an expert witness. At trial, the plaintiff may, through the testimony of his treating physician, records, or “other evidence,” be able to establish “the standard of care in performing laser hair removal and the known risks of the procedure” … . Therefore, contrary to the court’s determination, although the plaintiff is precluded from offering the testimony of an expert witness whose identity must be disclosed pursuant to CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i), at this juncture, it cannot be determined that the plaintiff will be unable to establish a prima facie case of negligence … . Mishli v Advanced Dermatology Laser & Cosmetic Surgery, P.C., 2024 NY Slip Op 04386, Second Dept 9-11-24

Practice Point: In this case alleging scarring and burning during laser hair removal, the dismissal of a medical malpractice cause of action because the identity of an expert witness has not been disclosed did not necessarily preclude a negligence cause of action proven by the testimony of plaintiff’s treating physician.

 

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