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STATE DESIGN DEFECT AND FAILURE TO WARN ACTION IS PREEMPTED BY THE FEDERAL HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION ACT (HMTA), CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Rodriguez, determined the state defective-design and failure-to-warn action stemming from an allegedly defective compressed gas cylinder was preempted by the federal Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA). …”…  [T]he HMTA’s express preemption provision encompasses state law claims ‘about’ ‘the designing, manufacturing, fabricating, inspecting, marking, maintaining, reconditioning, repairing, or testing [of] a package, container, or packaging component that is represented, marked, certified, or sold as qualified for use in transporting hazardous material in commerce’ … “:

… Federal preemption is based on the US Constitution’s Supremacy Clause …  …

The issue of federal preemption is a question of law …, since it concerns whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation … , Congress has enacted a law for which a particular state rule is “to the Contrary”  … .

An “inquiry into the scope of a statute’s pre-emptive effect is guided by the rule that ‘the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case” … .. “If a federal law contains an express pre-emption clause,” as here, “it does not immediately end the inquiry because the question of the substance and scope of Congress’ displacement of state law still remains” …

Whether dealing with “express or implied pre-emption, we begin our analysis ‘with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress'” … . “That assumption applies with particular force when Congress has legislated in a field traditionally occupied by the States” … . “Thus, when the text of a pre-emption clause is susceptible of more than one plausible reading, courts ordinarily ‘accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption'” … .

Notwithstanding the above, “[i]f the statute contains an express pre-emption clause, the task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent” … .

Accordingly, although courts will not hesitate to hold that state common-law claims are preempted by federal legislation, the analysis in each express preemption case must turn on the precise language of the relevant preemption provision … .

… [T]he defense of preemption may be raised at any time  … .Malerba v New York City Tr. Auth., 2024 NY Slip Op 04344, First Dept 8-29-24

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for the analysis of and criteria for preemption of a state action by a federal statute.

 

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