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TO, SUA SPONTE, DECIDE BRANCHES OF A MOTION AND CROSS-MOTION ON A GROUND NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES DEPRIVED PLAIINTIFF OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO REFUTE THE JUDGE’S DETERMINATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court in this foreclosure action, determined the judge should not have decided branches of a motion and cross-motion on a ground not raised by the parties, i.e. “in the interest of justice” on the ground the action was commenced “when foreclosures were stayed due to [the[ Covid-19 pandemic:”

“The lack of notice and opportunity to be heard implicates the fundamental issue of fairness that is the cornerstone of due process” … . As the plaintiff correctly contends, the Supreme Court improperly determined the subject branches of the parties’ motion and cross-motion on the ground that the action was commenced when “foreclosures were stayed due to [the] Covid-19 pandemic.” Sino [defendant] did not argue in support of the cross-motion that the plaintiff improperly commenced the action during any COVID-19-related stay or that it was prejudiced because the action was commenced during any COVID-19-related stay. Thus, the plaintiff was prejudiced, since it was “never afforded the opportunity to present evidence refuting the court’s sua sponte determination” … . Accordingly, the court should not have determined the subject branches of the motion and cross-motion on a ground that was never raised by the parties … . Austin 26 Dental Group, PLLC v Sino Northeast Metals (U.S.A.), Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 04187, Second Dept 8-14-24

Practice Point: Judges cannot decide motions on a ground not raised by the parties.

 

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