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DEFENDANT WAS ACQUITTED OF MENACING AT THE FIRST TRIAL BUT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE MENACING CHARGES WAS ALLOWED IN THE SECOND TRIAL; THE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE PRECLUDED PRESENTATION OF THAT EVIDENCE IN THE SECOND TRIAL; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s convictions and ordering a new trial, determined defendant’s acquittal of menacing in his first trial precluded evidence defendant displayed a firearm during a confrontation in the second trial:

At his second trial, the People were permitted to introduce in their case-in-chief, over defendant’s objection, the testimony of an eyewitness that, during a confrontation in a park that occurred prior to the shooting, defendant had pulled out a gun and waved it at the victim, and had cocked the gun and pointed it at the eyewitness. We agree with defendant that, under the circumstances here, the People were collaterally estopped by the earlier verdict from presenting evidence at defendant’s second trial concerning the alleged display of a gun during the earlier confrontation at the park … .

The doctrine of collateral estoppel “operates in a criminal prosecution to bar relitigation of issues necessarily resolved in defendant’s favor at an earlier trial” … . “[W]here the People have had a full and fair opportunity to contest issues, but have failed, it would be inequitable and harassive to again permit the prosecution to establish these same matters, as if the first trial had never taken place” … . Only those facts that were “necessarily decided” by a prior acquittal will have collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent prosecution … . Although it may “normally be impossible to ascertain the exact import of a verdict,” we are charged with giving “a practical, rational reading to the record of the first trial” to determine “whether a rational jury could have grounded its decision on an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration” … .

Here, the two menacing counts alleged that defendant intentionally placed or attempted to place another person in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury, or death by displaying what appeared to be a firearm, on the basis of his alleged actions at the park shortly before the murder. The eyewitness’s testimony at the first trial was the only evidence supporting the menacing counts. People v Moore, 2024 NY Slip Op 03941, Fourth Dept 7-26-24

Practice Point: Evidence supporting charges of which defendant was acquitted in the first trial cannot be presented in the second trial.

 

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