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A COUNTY RECYCLING TRUCK IS NOT ENGAGED IN ROAD WORK AND THEREFORE IS NOT EXEMPT FROM THE RULES OF THE ROAD UNDER THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court in this traffic accident case, determined a county recycling truck was not engaged in the type of road work which is exempted from the rules of the road under the Vehicle and Traffic Law. The related affirmative defense should have been dismissed:

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) provides that the rules of the road do not apply to “persons, teams, motor vehicles, and other equipment while actually engaged in work on a highway” … . “[T]he law was intended to exempt from the rules of the road all teams and vehicles that ‘build highways, repair or maintain them, paint the pavement markings, remove the snow, sand the pavement and do similar work’ . . . Thus, the exemption turns on the nature of the work being performed (construction, repair, maintenance or similar work)—not on the nature of the vehicle performing the work” … .

Inasmuch as municipal refuse collection does not involve building, repairing, or maintaining highways, painting pavement markings, removing snow, sanding the pavement, or doing other similar work (see id.) and is “a task which one would anticipate could be accomplished while obeying the rules of the road”…, we conclude that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 does not apply to the facts presented here … . In reaching that conclusion, we note that the 2016 amendment to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 117-a (L 2016, ch 293, § 1)—which broadened the definition of “hazard vehicle” to include sani-vans and waste collection vehicles—did not broaden the scope of work that would constitute “engag[ing] in work on a highway” … .

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) further provides that section 1202 (a)—which regulates stopping, standing, and parking—does not apply to “hazard vehicles while actually engaged in hazardous operation on or adjacent to a highway” … . That provision, however, does not shield defendants from the allegations of negligence raised by plaintiff, i.e., violations of the right-of-way provisions of Article 26 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, including, inter alia, sections 1140, 1142 (a), and 1146 (b). Rouse v City of Syracuse Dept. of Pub. Works, 2024 NY Slip Op 03938, Fourth Dept 7-26-24

Practice Point: A county recycling truck is not engaged in road work and therefore is not exempt from the rules of the road under the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

 

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