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IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE ALLEGING SEXUAL ABUSE BY A TEACHER DURING THE SCHOOL DAY OVER THE COURSE OF A YEAR, PLAINTIFF RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT UNDER BOTH RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AND NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CAUSES OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this Child Victims Act action, determined the respondeat superior and negligent supervision causes of action against the school alleging sexual abuse of the plaintiff by a teacher should not have been dismissed. Essentially the complaint alleged negligent supervision of both the teacher and the child. The defendant school did not demonstrate a lack of constructive notice of the abuse which allegedly took place over the course of a year in the same classroom during the school day:

“The employer’s negligence lies in having placed the employee in a position to cause foreseeable harm, harm which would most probably have been spared the injured party had the employer taken reasonable care in making decisions respecting the hiring, . . . retention, or supervision of the employee” … .

… “[A] school has a duty to exercise the same degree of care toward its students as would a reasonably prudent parent, and will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision. The duty owed derives from the simple fact that a school, in assuming physical custody and control over its students, effectively takes the place of parents and guardians” … . * * *

… [T]he defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that they lacked constructive notice of the teacher’s alleged abusive propensities and conduct … . “In particular, given the frequency of the alleged abuse, which occurred over” the entirety of a school year, “and always occurred inside the same classroom during the school day, the defendants did not eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether they should have known of the abuse” … .. The defendants similarly failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that their supervision of both the teacher and the plaintiff was not negligent … . Sayegh v City of Yonkers, 2024 NY Slip Op 03065, Second Dept 6-5-24

Practice Point: Here it was alleged plaintiff was sexually abused by a teacher repeatedly over a year during the school day. There were questions of fact whether the school had constructive notice of the abuse which supported causes of action under a respondeat superior theory (negligent supervision of the teacher) and a negligent supervision theory (negligent supervision of the child).

 

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