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HERE IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT (CVA) CASE, THE ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE OF PLAINTIFF BY A TEACHER WERE BASED ON HER INABILITY TO CONSENT UNDER THE PENAL LAW; THEREFORE THE SCHOOL COULD ONLY BE LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION UNTIL PLAINTIFF TURNED 17; ALTHOUGH THE ABUSE WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE OFF SCHOOL GROUNDS, THE TEACHER, DURING SCHOOL HOURS, ALLEGEDLY MADE PUBLIC COMMENTS ABOUT PLAINTIFF’S APPEARANCE AND MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO MEET HER AFTER SCHOOL; THE NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE SCHOOL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the negligent supervision cause of action against the school based upon alleged conduct by a teacher should not have been dismissed, despite the fact the abuse allegedly took place off school grounds: The abuse was alleged to be conduct which would violate article 130 of the Penal Law. Plaintiff was legally incapable of consent until she turned 17. The school was deemed responsible for supervision only until plaintiff turned 17:

The allegations of criminal conduct against the teacher were based on the plaintiff’s inability to consent to sexual conduct due to the plaintiff’s age, which ended when the plaintiff turned 17 years old (see Penal Law § 130.05[3][a]). Accordingly, the court properly determined that the CVA did not revive so much of the cause of action alleging negligent supervision of the plaintiff as was related to alleged conduct that occurred after the plaintiff turned 17 years old … .

… The defendants’ submissions included … the transcript of the plaintiff’s deposition testimony, wherein the plaintiff testified that all of the sexual abuse occurred off school property and outside of school hours … . In opposition, however, the plaintiff … averred that the teacher singled her out for attention, made extended eye contact with her, winked at her, and complimented her appearance in front of other staff in school. According to the plaintiff, the teacher made comments directly to other staff and in the presence of other students about the plaintiff’s appearance, and the teacher made arrangements with the plaintiff during school hours and on school grounds to meet after school where the alleged abuse took place … . Fain v Berry, 2024 NY Slip Op 03032, Second Dept 6-5-24

Practice Point: Allegations of violations of Penal Law article 130 based upon the legal incapacity to consent apply only until the victim turns 17.

Practice Point: Although the alleged abuse by a teacher took place off school grounds, the teacher, during school hours, made public comments about plaintiff’s appearance and arranged to meet her after school. There the negligent supervision cause of action against the school should not have been dismissed.

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DEFENDANT WAS NOT AN OWNER OR A GENERAL CONTRACTOR AND EXERCISED NO SUPERVISORY... SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES...