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TENANT’S ATTACK ON PLAINTIFF WAS NOT FORESEEABLE; THEREFORE THE LANDLORD WAS NOT LIABLE IN NEGLIGENCE FOR FAILING TO EVICT THE TENANT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a tenant’s (Girard’s) attack on plaintiff was not foreseeable. Therefore the negligence action against the landlord for failing to evict Girard was dismissed:

Defendant demonstrated … that it was not liable for third-party defendant Girard’s attack on plaintiff because it was not reasonably foreseeable … . No evidence was presented that Girard had engaged in criminal conduct prior to the attack or that he was violent, had a propensity toward violence, or had threatened any tenants of the building. Inconsiderate behavior, such as playing loud music at all hours, engaging in loud arguments with his sister in the apartment, and banging on the apartment walls, is insufficient to have placed defendant on notice that Girard would stab plaintiff in response to plaintiff’s noise complaints … . While it was conceivable that the dispute might escalate into violence, “conceivability is not the equivalent of foreseeability” … . Plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact concerning whether defendant was negligent in not taking steps to evict Girard prior to the attack…. . Goris v New York City Hous. Auth., 2024 NY Slip Op 02661, First Dept 5-14-24

Practice Point: Here the tenant who attacked plaintiff, although loud and argumentative, had never been violent. Therefore the tenant’s attack was not foreseeable and the landlord could not be held liable in negligence for failing to evict the tenant.

 

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